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Abstract 
 
The global economic and financial instability context of the 1990s and 2000s also affected 
the Turkish economy. Actually, the 1980s in Turkey are characterized by a radical 
transformation of its economy through significant efforts of liberalization. With an out-
looking economy and a liberalized financial system in the early 1990s, Turkey was an 
example of successful liberalization process for the other developing countries. However, 
this "remarkable" liberalization process, which was performed without ex ante correction 
of persistent macroeconomic imbalances, worsened economic and financial instabilities 
and caused two severe crises in April 1994 and February 2001. This paper aims to illustrate 
the essential causes of these crises by developing a binomial and multivariate logit model 
which estimates the predictive ability of 16 economic and financial indicators in a sample 
that covers the period January 1990-December 2002. In addition, the paper evaluates the 
out-of-sample forecast performance of the model in the period January 2003-December 
2008 in which two other currency crises occurred in May 2006 and October 2008. The 
paper finds that the Turkish crises are mainly due to excessive budget deficits, high money 
supply growths, sharp rises in short-term external debt, growing riskiness of the banking 
system (in particular currency and liquidity mismatches), and external adverse shocks. 
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I. Introduction 
 
After a relative stability in the post-World War II period, the world economy has again 
become familiar to financial crises following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. 
The first wave of the currency and debt crises that occurred particularly in Latin American 
countries in early 1980s was first followed by the 1992-1993 European exchange-rate 
mechanism (ERM) crisis and then by two large-scale crisis episodes: the collapse of the 
Mexican peso at the end of 1994 and the consecutive financial crises in East Asia that 
began with the devaluation of Thai baht in July 1997 and induced a chain reaction in many 
Asian economies. The common characteristic of these two crises is their tendency to 
spread to other economies (contagion). However, the latter created much more external 
consequences, affecting the whole global economy, while the former had only a regional 
impact. The series of crises continued on with the violent devaluation of the Russian rubble 
in August 1998, the outbreak of the Brazilian currency crisis in early 1999 and the eruption 
of the Argentinean financial crisis in 2001-2002. This global economic and financial 
instability context of the 1990s 2000s affected the Turkish economy as well which suffered 
from two severe crisis episodes in April 1994 and February 2001, and two relatively less 
severe currency crises in May 2006 and October 2008. These striking and recurrent crisis 
episodes stimulated a large discussion on the theoretical specification of the crisis models 
on the one hand, and on the empirical analyses that aim at identifying the causes and 
origins of the crises on the other hand. This paper thus intends to sum up these theoretical 
and empirical developments and also to construct an early warning system (EWS) through 
a logit model which illustrates the main causes of these Turkish crisis episodes. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II clarifies the stylized facts of the Turkish 
crises. Section III summarizes the theoretical and empirical literature on currency crises. 
Section IV implements the development of the EWS (construction of crisis index, 
description of the explanatory variables of the econometric model). Section V presents the 
estimation results and asses the model’s predictive ability both in-sample and out-of-
sample and Section VI concludes and discusses some policy implications to prevent future 
crisis in the Turkish economy. 
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II. Brief history of the Turkish economy (1980-2008) 
 
Following the inability of the existing economic and political system in resolving the 
severe currency and debt crisis of 1978-1980, Turkey reoriented its development strategy, 
based on import substitution on the real side and on negative real interest rates on the 
financial side, by adopting a radical structural adjustment program in January 1980. This 
program which aimed to implement a market-based mode of regulation was largely 
supported by international organizations (the IMF and the World Bank). With the 
implementation of this liberalization process, the political and monetary authorities 
intended to restore economic growth and stability by improving economic and financial 
efficiency, increasing domestic savings and attracting foreign capitals. 
 
The early phase of the program (1980-1984) was mostly characterized by the trade 
liberalization process consisted in export promotion and gradual import liberalization, 
accompanied by the regulated capital movements and regular depreciation of Turkish lira 
(Boratav and Yeldan, 2002). While the second phase of the program (1985-1989) was 
characterized by the process of the domestic and external financial liberalization, 
consisting of the abolition of interest rate controls, the liberalization of the exchange rate 
regime allowing residents (banks as well as households) to make transactions in foreign 
currency, the creation of the interbank money market and of the Capital Market Board and 
the liberalization of the capital movements. This large structural reform program obtained 
an initial success by reducing the triple-digit inflation rates to 30-40%, increasing the 
export earnings and ensuring an economic growth of around 5% of GDP per year. With an 
out-looking economy and a liberalized financial system in the early 1990s, the Turkish 
liberalization process was presented by the IMF and the World Bank as an example of 
“success story” to other developing countries. However, this "remarkable" transformation 
from inward-oriented economy to the outward-oriented one, which was performed without 
ex ante correction of persistent macroeconomic imbalances, worsened the economic and 
financial weaknesses by exposing the domestic economy to short-term volatile capital 
movements, and then caused two deep financial crises occurred in April 1994 and February 
2001 with severe economic and social consequences. 
 
What are the determinants of these financial crises? Do they present common 
characteristics or do they have different origins? After a relative improvement of 
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government’s budget balances in the 1980-1987 period, public sector deficits and domestic 
prices started to rise again. The widening of the public sector deficits largely resulted from 
expansionist fiscal policies of the government, large subsidies granted to exporting firms, 
inefficient and archaic fiscal structure and populist economic policies of successive 
governments. Hence the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) and public debt 
followed a steady rising trend parallel to the widening of public deficits. This context 
drove to an increase of domestic interest rates and of the inflation rate in the late 1980s. 
The rise of inflation and the gradual depreciation of the Turkish lira that were combined 
with the capital account liberalization led to a large dollarization of the Turkish economy 
in the early 1990s. 
 
The initial success of the stabilization program was indeed reached in part through a drastic 
reduction of the real wages which was facilitated in the context of repressive military 
regime (1980-1983). Following the return of the parliamentary democracy in 1987, the 
different coalition governments implemented large increases in real labor incomes that 
degraded public fiscal balances and reduced international trade competitiveness that 
engendered large trade and current account deficits. The international political context of 
the Gulf War in 1991 and consequently raising oil prices also played an important role in 
the deterioration of the current account balance (around 5% of GDP in 1993 before the 
onset of the 1994 crisis). 
 
These fiscal and current account deficits led to a huge stock of public debt (65 billion of 
USD) largely compensated by the domestic financial institutions that preferred to invest in 
Treasury funds instead of granting credits to private sector (crowding-out effect). In this 
context, domestic banks got into debt in foreign currency with the international financial 
markets in order to invest in the public sector securities in domestic currency. This 
generated a strong growth of the domestic banks short positions. On the other hand, short-
term foreign debt of the Turkish economy reached to 18.5 billion USD, while its 
international reserves stock was attaining only 7 billion USD in 1993. 
 
In order to reduce this high public debt stock and to extend its maturity, the government 
imposed long-termed and low-rated government securities to domestic investors, whereas 
it started to monetize public deficits in the second half of 1993. This policy change led to 
an excessive domestic credit growth of 95% that contributed to an increase of domestic 
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inflation rate and thus a rise in foreign money demand to the Central Bank. The successive 
speculative attacks against Turkish lira that began in the end of January 1994 followed by 
the degradation of Turkey’s credit rating accelerated capital outflows. The domestic 
interest rates skyrocketed (from 70-80% in December 1993 to 700% in March 1994). The 
Government’s interventions in the exchange market by selling its international reserves 
stocks could not avoid large currency depreciation of about 100%. This currency crisis 
then spread out to the banking system which was largely exposed to currency and maturity 
risks (the banking sector foreign liabilities had reached to 43% of its total liabilities in the 
late 1993). The Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF) took control over three small-scale 
banks (Marmarabank, TYT Bank and Impexbank). Following this banking liquidity crisis, 
banks (in particular foreign capital banks) limited domestic credit allocation or lent in 
foreign currency. This lending policy just transferred currency risk on their borrowers and 
also worsened economic contraction (-6% of GDP in 1994). 
 
In order to prevent a possible systemic crisis, monetary authorities signed a stand-by 
agreement with the IMF on 5th April 1994. This stabilization program aimed to limit fiscal 
deficits by increasing tax revenues and reducing government expenditures. Besides, the 
Central Bank announced total deposit insurance so as to restore depositors’ confidence in 
the Turkish banking sector. However, even if this policy measure restored depositors’ 
confidence in the short-term, it was at the origin of the failure and the transfer of eight 
commercial and investment banks to the SDIF in the 1998-1999 period. Furthermore, the 
implementation of drastic policy measures of the stabilization program restored a certain 
economic and financial stability in the short-run, but mid-term structural adjustment 
measures of the program such as reforms of the social security and fiscal systems and 
privatization of state owned enterprises (SOS) were not achieved. Thus, chronic 
imbalances of the Turkish economy were not corrected. The occurrence of the 1997-1998 
Asian crisis and particularly of the 1998 Russian crisis affected the Turkish economy that 
recorded a slowing-down and capital outflows of 10 billion USD in the late 1998. The 
August 1999 earthquake eliminated the Turkish monetary authorities’ last hopes of 
economic recovery. In the end of 1999, Turkish economy was characterized by chronic 
high inflation, contraction of economic activity, large public debt (over 70% of GDP), high 
public sector borrowing requirement (about 16% of GDP), inefficient and fragile banking 
system, and domestic and foreign investors’ generalized defiance into the Turkish 
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economy and financial institutions. This instability context led Turkish authorities to sign 
another stand-by agreement with the IMF. 
 
Turkey thus entered the new millennium with an exchange-rate-based stabilization 
program which was supported by the IMF stand-by credits. The country undertook to 
decrease the inflation rate to 25% in 2000 then to 12% in 2001. The program was also 
accompanied by a restrictive budgetary and monetary policy which enabled the Central 
Bank to increase the domestic liquidity only with capital inflows (that gave the program a 
currency board character). 
 
The program found a positive echo among economic agents: the capital inflows accelerated 
(15.2 billion USD in 2000), the interest rates strongly decreased (from more than 80% to 
about 40%), and the consumption sharply increased in particular with low-cost bank 
credits. However, this sharp increase of domestic consumption mainly met by importations 
slowed down the inflation fall and led to an overvaluation of the Turkish lira (about 15%) 
compared to the pre-announced parity of the fixed exchange rate. This deteriorated in turn 
the trade balance (deficit of 27 billion USD at the end of 2000) and the current account 
balance (deficit of 9.8 billion USD, 4.9% of the GDP). Besides, the rise of the short-term 
debt associated to the failure in achieving the privatization goals increased the tensions in 
the Turkish money market and created doubts on the sustainability of the program. The 
international investors became then increasingly reluctant in renewing their credit lines, 
which increased the domestic interest rates and their volatility. Furthermore, the strong 
exposure of the banking system to currency and interest rate mismatches, and to credit and 
default risks enhanced these doubts. At the end of October 2000, the SDIF took control 
over two small scale banks (Etibank, Bank Kapital). 
 
Besides, domestic banks started to cover their short currency positions in order to strike 
their balance sheets at the end of the year. This accelerated the demand for liquidity and 
increased more the interest rates, and then weakened more the illiquid banks that began 
distress sales of their Treasury bonds. In the end of November, the leading banks 
suspended their credit lines to the interbank market. The interest rates skyrocketed 
(overnight rate about 4000%) and the foreign investors started to leave the country. This 
was the beginning of the banking system liquidity crisis. In order to protect the banking 
sector and to limit the rise of the interest rates, the Central Bank suspended its currency 
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board commitment and bailed out the illiquid banks. However, the investors were 
reassured only on December 6th, with the 7.5 billion USD IMF Supplemental Reserve 
Facility.2 On the same day, Demirbank, the sixth largest bank of the Turkish banking 
system, was transferred to the SDIF. 
 
Nevertheless, the strong deterioration of the financial structure of the public banks and the 
SDIF banks and their massive requirements for short-term credits increased again the 
interest rates that led investors to question the sustainability of the fixed exchange system. 
Actually, it was the rumors of political instability that triggered the second shock. The 
country underwent a strong speculative attack against its currency and was forced to let the 
currency float. The currency crisis worsened in turn the banking liquidity crisis. Here is an 
example of so-called twin crises a la Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). 
 
The analysis of the 2000-2001 Turkish financial crisis mainly confirms the new crisis 
approaches by referring on the one hand to animal spirits and on the other hand to the 
banking system fragility. Whereas the macroeconomic fundamentals of the country did not 
justify a crisis of such scale, the financial crisis broke out on February 19th 2001 with the 
argument between the Prime Minister and the President of the Republic which was 
perceived by financial markets as a signal of political instability. The days following this 
scene were crucial in the country’s crisis management. Turkey defended the fixed 
exchange rate parity by mobilizing its reserve stocks (5 billion USD in three days) and 
increasing the overnight interest rates to 8000%. However, following the investors’ 
generalized distrust, the monetary authorities were forced to let the currency float, on 
February 22nd, 2001. In only one day, the Turkish lira depreciated of more than 35% 
against the US dollar.3 
 
The real economy was also affected by this severe financial crisis in spite of the 
implementation of the new economic stabilization program announced on 14th April 2001 
by the new Minister of Economy, Kemal Dervis, ex Vice-president of the World Bank. 
The main purpose of this program, backed by the 19 billion USD IMF stand-by credits, 
was to restore economic stability and restructure the financial system which cost over 50 
                                                 
2
 IMF’s Supplemental Reserve Facility is a sort of short-term credit granted to the countries which suffer 
balance of payments problems and/or currency crises. 
3
 See Ari and Dagtekin (2008) and Uygur (2001) for an amplified study on the stylized facts of the 2000-
2001 Turkish financial crisis. 
 8 
billion USD to the Turkish economy. Despite the high decline of economic activity 
(around 8% of GDP) in 2001, the implementation of many structural reforms provided a 
rapid economic recovery from 2002 onwards. Although, even the Turkish economy seems 
now more stable, it still remains vulnerable to external shocks as the May 2006 and 
October 2008 currency crises confirmed. Actually, the last global financial crisis of late 
2008 has heavily affected Turkey: the Turkish lira has depreciated of more than 25% 
against the US dollar and the 2009 economic perspectives have now turned to negative 
with expectations of economic recession (more than 4% of GDP) and rising 
unemployment. Note that the actual risks of the Turkish economy may be summarized to 
the current account deficit which is more than 7% of GDP and to the private sector foreign 
debt stock that is superior to 150 billion USD. 
 
III. The review of the theoretical and empirical crisis literature 
 
The recurrent crisis episodes since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system led to a 
flourishing crisis literature. Following the first wave of currency crises, in particular those 
that came out in Latin America in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, Krugman (1979) and 
Flood and Garber (1984) developed the so-called first generation crisis models4 in which 
currency crises are linked to persistent economic imbalances (large and growing fiscal 
deficits and/or gradual domestic credit growth) that are in conflict with a fixed exchange 
rate regime. Actually, the monetization of the persistent fiscal deficits in the fixed 
exchange rate regime leads to domestic credit growth and in parallel to gradual loss of 
foreign exchange reserves of the government. When the reserves stock reaches a critical 
threshold, investors perfectly know that the domestic exchange rate is no longer 
sustainable. Investors attack then the domestic currency in order to avoid capital losses due 
to a possible devaluation. Here, the investors’ "rational" reaction triggers the currency 
crisis; however, the crisis would break out even in the absence of a speculative attack when 
the government foreign exchange reserves are “naturally” exhausted. 
 
The outbreak of the 1992-1993 ERM crisis led to the development of the new crisis 
models, in particular by Obstfeld (1994, 1996, 1997). In these so-called second generation 
models, a crisis can be triggered without ex ante significant deterioration of 
                                                 
4
 For a detailed analysis of the generation of currency crises, see Eichengreen et al. (1994 and 1995), and 
Flood and Marion (1998). 
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macroeconomic fundamentals in contrary to first generation crisis models. Therefore, even 
if economic policies are consistent with the fixed exchange regime, a speculative attack 
may occur while investors shift their expectations towards the sustainability of the 
exchange rate. Unlike the first generation models where policymakers are supposed to 
have a mechanical and simplified behavior against a speculative attack (selling 
international reserves and then floating the peg when the reserves stock is exhausted); in 
the second generation models policymakers are supposed to have an optimizing behavior 
by adapting their policy to the shift of the investors’ anticipations. That means when 
policymakers face a speculative attack, they decide to maintain or to abandon the peg after 
comparing the costs of such policy decision. This may be defined as the government loss 
function. Indeed, here economic policies are not predetermined as in the first generation 
models, but they are adapted to the problems of the economy and to the investors’ 
expectations about the macroeconomic fundamentals observed in period t , but also about 
the sustainability of the government policies in 1t + . This interaction between the 
government and investors creates multiple equilibria that may lead to the occurrence of 
self-fulfilling currency crises. In these models the exact timing of the crisis is unpredictable 
in contrary to the first generation models. However, one may show whether a country is 
vulnerable to a crisis according to the fragility of some macroeconomic fundamentals. 
When a country enters to the “crisis zone” (Jeanne, 1997), a shift in investors’ expectations 
– generally triggered by sunspot dynamics – may bring a crisis. 
 
The outbreak of the 1997 Asian crisis led to a reorientation of the crisis models. Indeed, 
Asian crisis countries did not have large budget deficits and economic policies were not 
expansionary; thus there were no Krugman-type policy inconsistency problems that led to 
a gradual loss of reserves. On the other hand, unemployment and inflation rates were 
relatively low and the average economic growth was around 7% in the 1993-1996 period; 
thus, there were no Obstfeld-type trade-off problems that force the government to devalue 
or to maintain the peg. These assumptions were in fact mainly confirmed by low interest 
rate spreads or high credit ratings of Asian economies to the approach of the crisis. This 
shows clearly that the Asian crisis was not expected and the dominant crisis theories failed 
to understand these consecutive crisis episodes that began with the Thai baht devaluation. 
Several theoretical studies were then conducted in order to explain the characteristics of 
these violent and contagious crisis episodes that resulted largely from the banking sector 
weaknesses in a financially liberalized economy. In this sense, some modelers put forward 
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the structural distortions such as implicit or explicit public guarantees and inadequate 
banking regulation system in the worsening of the financial vulnerability (Krugman, 1998 
and Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini, 1999). Others focus on the self-fulfilling nature of the 
Asian crisis by modeling the dynamics of the financial instability based on the Diamond 
and Dybvig (1983) bank runs model (Chang and Velasco, 1998, 2001). Some others 
formalize a financial fragility, due to an increase of short-term foreign debt, which may 
contribute to the occurrence of a financial crisis. The depreciation of the domestic currency 
deteriorates then the balance sheets of the firms whose bankruptcies lead to economic 
contraction (Krugman, 1999 and Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee, 2000). Finally, some 
make efforts to combine these different approaches (Irwin and Vines, 1999, 2003, 
Schneider and Tornell, 2000, Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo, 2004). 
 
The very high costs of crises in terms of economic contraction, unemployment, and 
necessary financial restructuration process for the public sector (and also for the private 
investors in terms of capital losses) have led to a proliferation of empirical studies 
(developed mainly by scholars, international financial institutions, central banks and 
investment banks) beside the theoretical models that have tended to explain crisis 
mechanism. These empirical models have aimed to predict crises by assessing their 
potential economic and financial determinants, and also in some cases by measuring 
political risks and developments in global economy. These studies have been also used by 
policymakers to prevent future crises by detecting their causes earlier. In this sense, they 
have been frequently called ‘early warning systems’ that are likely to inform policymakers 
(and investors as well) about the occurrence of a crisis in a near future.  
 
Two main approaches have been adopted for constructing EWSs; signals approach 
initiated by Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) and the logit/probit approach initiated 
by Eichengreen et al. (1994, 1996) and by Frankel and Rose (1996).5 Regardless of the 
method adopted, the empirical models construct first a crisis index as the dependent 
variable in order to identify crisis episodes. Some modelers describe currency crises as 
large depreciation or devaluation episodes (Frankel and Rose, 1996 and Kumar, Moorthy 
                                                 
5
 Note that others methods have been also used for developing early warning systems. Here, we do not 
analyze them but just state some of them for information: OLS approach of Sachs, Tornell and Velasco 
(1996) and of Bussière and Mulder (1999a, 1999b), artificial neural network of Nag and Mitra (1999), Fisher 
discriminant analysis of Burkart and Coudert (2000) and Markov-switching approach of Abiad (1999, 2003). 
One may find them in a detailed version in Abiad (1999, 2003) that realize a rough survey of recent empirical 
literature on currency crises. 
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and Perraudin, 2003 inter alia), while some others consider currency crises as instances 
where a currency come under severe speculative pressure (Eichengreen et al., 1994, 1995, 
1996 and Kaminsky et al., 1998 inter alia). This second currency crisis definition takes into 
account both the situations where speculative attacks lead to currency devaluation and 
where the authorities successfully defend the currency by intervening in the foreign 
exchange market and/or rising domestic interest rates. The authors that adopt the second 
definition construct then an index of speculative pressure or exchange market pressure 
ISP  as a weighted average of (real or nominal) exchange rate changes s , international 
reserves changes r  and interest rates movements i . 
 
(1) t tISP s= ∆  
(2) 1 1 1t t t t
s r i
ISP s r i
σ σ σ
= ∆ − ∆ + ∆  
 
The weights of the components of the crisis index are often chosen so as to equalize their 
volatility and thus avoid the possibility of one of the components dominating the index 
(Aziz, Caramazza and Salgado, 2000). Note that specifically the weights are frequently the 
inverse of the standard deviation σ  of the corresponding component. The “successful” 
attack approach may be criticized for its limited crisis definition given that every 
speculative attack has a social cost for the government (reserves losses or interest rate 
rises) while the speculative pressure approach is mostly criticized because of that arbitrary 
weighting procedure of the components. However, as noted in many papers (Eichengreen 
et al., 1995 and Lestano and Jacobs, 2007), using different weights for the components do 
not have much effect on the crisis index.  
 
Once components of the crisis index and their weights are determined, one specifies an 
arbitrary threshold. When the crisis index exceeds this threshold level, a monthly or annual 
observation is classified as crisis. The crisis index becomes then a binary crisis variable tC  
which takes a value of 1 if a crisis occurs and of 0 otherwise. 
 
(3) 1  if  >  
0  otherwise
t ISP ISP
t
ISP
C
φσ µ+
= 

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The threshold level is generally set to a multiple φ  of the standard deviation of the index 
ISPσ  plus the mean of the index ISPµ . Values of the thresholds used in the literature have 
been ranged from 1.5 σ×  to 3 σ×  above the mean of the index. However, different 
choices of thresholds may generate identification of the different crisis dates as some 
studies obviously showed it (Kamin, Schindler and Samuel, 2001 and Lestano and Jacobs, 
2007). Note also that crisis dates may be different from one study to another according to 
the index components (whether interest rates and/or reserves are included into the index), 
and to the nominal or real character of the index components. This is why empirical studies 
should use different crisis definitions and different values of thresholds, as I do in this 
paper, in order to asses the robustness of their crisis dating schemes. 
 
After defining crisis dating mechanism, the next step of constructing an EWS consists in 
selecting the adequate methodology. The non parametric signaling approach aims to 
monitor whether some key variables tend to behave unusually prior the onset of a crisis. 
They firstly build a crisis index and secondly transform the early warning indicators of the 
model into binary signals by defining an “optimal” threshold for each indicator. Therefore, 
when an indicator jtX  crosses beyond a given threshold level 
j
tX , it issues a warning 
signal that a possible currency crisis may come out within a specified period (called 
signaling horizon) of usually 12-24 months. An indicator jtX  becomes then a signal jtS  
which defines the condition of the transition from a non-crisis state (0) to a crisis state (1) 
in the following manner: 
 
(4) 
1  if  >  
0  if 
j j
t tj
t j j
t t
X X
S
X X

= 
≤
 
 
A signal jtS  is called a “good signal” if a crisis occurs within the signaling horizon and a 
“false signal” or “noise” otherwise. A perfect indicator should provide only good signals: 
 and 0A D >  and  and 0B C = , but it is not the case in practice. So, Kaminsky et al. (1998) 
choose a threshold in order to minimize the noise-to-signal ratio, i.e. the ratio of false 
signals to good signals ( ) ( )/ / /B B D A A C+ + . This synthetic measure also allows 
evaluating the performance of each indicator: indicators with noise-to-signal ratios below 
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(above) unity are considered significant (insignificant) and the insignificant indicators are 
discarded outright. 
 
Table 1. The performance of an indicator 
 Crisis within 24 months No crisis within 24 months 
Signal issued A  B  
No signal issued C  D  
 
Here, A  represents the number of months in which an indicator issued a good signal, B  
represents the number of months in which an indicator signaled a crisis where there was no 
crisis in reality, C  is the number of months in which an indicator failed to signal a crisis 
which actually occurred and D  is the number of months in which an indicator did not 
correctly issue any signal. 
 
Kaminsky (1999) puts forward the analysis by constructing leading composite indicators as 
a weighted sum of the signaling indicators, where each indicator is weighted by the inverse 
of its noise-to-signal ratio. These composite indicators provide some information on the 
vulnerability of an economy to an upcoming crisis. However, as Edison (2003) states, the 
interpretation of the conditional probability of a future crisis based on the values of the 
composite indicators remains difficult.6 Besides, contrary to logit/probit non linear 
regressions, the signaling approach does not let itself to statistical tests and the estimated 
probabilities are less directly derived. Moreover, on looses some information when 
threshold levels are set for the indicators; for instance, an indicator does not give any signal 
even though it derives unusually from its trend, because it is just below the threshold, also 
once an indicator crosses the threshold, one cannot observe how deteriorated the indicator 
is. However, this approach presents an important advantage of giving policymakers an 
easily interpretable picture of problems of the economy by showing clearly which 
indicators exceed the calculated threshold level. 
 
The discrete-dependent-variable approach (or non linear regressions) evaluates directly the 
conditional probability of a crisis given a set of early warning indicators (that are not 
transformed into binary signals and are included into the econometric analysis in linear 
                                                 
6
 Berg and Pattillo (1998, 1999) embed the univariate signaling approach in a multivariate probit framework. 
They find that their model does have a better predictive performance in the anticipation of the 1997 Asian 
crisis compared to the initial signaling approach. 
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way) contrary to the signaling approach which aims to observe the unusual behavior of the 
individual indicators (transformed to binary signals) before the onset of a crisis and to 
evaluate ability of each indicator in forecasting crisis episodes. 
 
The method firstly requires construction of a crisis dummy variable tISP  that serves as the 
endogenous binary crisis variable tC  which takes a value of 1 if a crisis occurs and 0 
otherwise. One may define the crisis dummy variable as a large depreciation of the 
domestic currency as in the equation (1) or a large speculative pressure on currency as in 
the equation (2). A period is called a crisis episode when this crisis index exceeds a 
specific threshold level as described above in the equation (3). 
 
The estimated model takes then the following form: 
 
(5) ( ) ( )Prob t t k t kC X F Xβ β− −=  
 
where the probability of a crisis 1tC =  is estimated one or k-step before the occurrence of 
a crisis, conditional on a given set of lagged explanatory variables t kX − . β  is the vector of 
parameters or coefficients of the variables and F  is a cumulative distribution function. If 
the cumulative distribution function is logistic or normal, we have the logit or probit model 
where the probability of a crisis is calculated in the following manners. These two below 
equations do have very similar estimation results so the preference of one to other is up to 
the modeler.7  
 
(6) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
exp
Prob 1
1 exp
t k
t t k t k
t k
X
C X F X
X
ββ β β
−
− −
−
= = =
+
 
(7) ( ) ( ) 21 1Prob 1 exp 22
tX
t t k t k t k t kC X F X X dXβ β
pi
− − − −
−∞
 
= = Φ = − 
 
∫  
 
This approach has the advantage of summarizing the information about the crisis 
probability in one easily interpretable number (0 in case of non crisis and 1 in case of the 
                                                 
7
 Here, I present a summary of the logit/probit models. For more details about discrete-choice models, see 
Maddala (1983), Davidson and MacKinnon (1999), Wooldridge (2002), Green (2003), Gujarati (2004). 
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crisis). In addition, it considers all the early warning indicators simultaneously in a 
multivariate framework, observes marginal contribution of an each indicator and thus 
allows discarding the insignificant ones from the analysis. Furthermore, this approach 
lends itself to standard statistical tests that measure robustness of the estimation results. 
However, in this approach the interpretation of the estimated coefficients of the indicators 
remains difficult because of the non linear nature of the model. Also, unlike the signaling 
approach, it is unable to rank indicators according to their ability of forecasting accuracy. 
 
The third step in the construction of an EWS consists in selecting a set of potential crisis 
determinants. In that sense, one surveys both the theoretical crisis literature and the former 
empirical studies that put forward some potential key crisis factors.8 Regardless of the 
methodology adopted and/or countries and period of the sample selected, some indicators 
generally emerge as informative and significant in predicting crisis episodes: 
overvaluations of the domestic currency, high ratios of M2 to foreign exchange reserves, 
domestic credit growths, high ratios of short-term debt to foreign exchange reserves, and 
also outbreak of a crisis in another country (contagion). This shows the fact that –as stated 
in Arias 2003– in order to explain crisis episodes, particularly those that came out in the 
late 1990s, one needs to combine the determinants underlined in the so-called first, second 
and third generation crisis models. 
 
However, note that some indicators that are significant in some studies are not in others. 
This may result from the different sample countries, the different sample periods or the 
different adopted methodologies. Since the developing and industrialized countries present 
different structural economic characteristics, the origin of the crises may shift from one 
group to other. Thus, some indicators like current account deficits that explain well the 
emerging market crises may not be informative in the industrialized country crises. 
Moreover, as shown in Cartapanis, Dropsy and Mametz (1998), the significance of the 
indicators may change according to the regional differences. For instance, while a high 
ratio of the domestic credit to GDP is a good indicator in explaining the crises of the Latin 
American countries, it does not play a crucial role in the occurrence of the Asian crises. 
                                                 
8
 Note actually that the empirical studies adapt their crisis indicators to the developing theoretical crisis 
literature. While the early papers (Blanco and Garber, 1986) focused on the public deficits, increase in 
domestic credit as crisis indicators, the recent studies (Abiad, 2003, Mulder, Perrelli and Rocha, 2002, 2007 
and Ari and Dagtekin, 2007, 2008) took into account the impact of the debt variables and/or of financial or 
corporate sector fragility indicators in predicting crisis episodes. 
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Furthermore, as noted in Abiad (2003), the crisis determinants may change even in the 
outbreak of the crises occurred in a specific region. Abiad underlines that only the 
overvaluation of the domestic currency is a common and significant indicator in the 
occurrence of the crises in five Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South 
Korea and Thailand). This is why I adopt in that paper one-country-approach limiting the 
empirical analysis to the Turkish crises occurred in April 1994 and February 2001. Here, I 
also limit the sample period from January 1990 to December 2002, because Turkey 
undertook important liberalization efforts during the 1980s that radically transformed its 
economy. In this case, a selected sample that covers pre- and post-liberalization periods 
could bias estimation results given the changing volatility of the variables. 
 
There is another factor of limiting this empirical study to the Turkish crises that is the 
limited in-sample and in particular out-of-sample forecast performance of the empirical 
papers that adopt multiple-country-approach as stated in Berg and Pattillo (1998) and Berg, 
Borensztein and Pattillo (2004). Of course, the predictions of those empirical models are 
significantly better than random guesses even in predicting the out-of-sample crises, but 
they generate a substantial number of false alarms and many missed crises. Actually, the 
forecast performance of an EWS model is measured by its ability to predict correctly and 
sufficiently in advance actual crisis episodes in-sample and also out-of-sample.9 In order to 
evaluate the performance of EWS models, one compares the predicted probability of a 
crisis typically produced by the EWS model with the actual crisis probability. However, 
the latter is not directly observable; one needs then to compare the predicted probability 
with the actual occurrence of crises. As the predicted probability is a continuous variable, a 
necessary step consists in specifying a probability level (the cut-off threshold) above which 
the predicted probability sends an alarm signal, implying that the model expects an 
upcoming crisis at some point along the forecasting horizon (Bussière and Fratzscher, 
2002, Berg et al., 2004). 
 
What is then the “optimal” threshold level? Choosing a lower threshold value would raise 
the number of correctly predicted crises, but at the expense of increasing the number of 
                                                 
9
 Indeed, a good EWS model should generate successful in-sample and out-of-sample predictions. In this 
sense, the modeler chooses an estimation sample in which the model is estimated in order to predict 
occurrence of the crises and to detect which variables help to explain their occurrence. The model is then re-
estimated in another sample period which does not belong to the initial sample. Alternatively, some modelers 
prefer to divide their initial sample period in sub-samples in which they re-estimate the model after testing its 
forecast performance in the whole sample period. 
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false alarms (Type II errors). By contrast, choosing a higher threshold value would reduce 
the number of false alarms, but at the expense of increasing the number of missed crises 
(Type I errors). The modeler solves here this trade-off problem by defining a threshold 
probability according to the relative importance given to Type I errors versus Type II 
errors. As stated in Chui (2002), the modeler may naturally choose a cut-off threshold of 
50%. However, as underlined in Esquivel and Larrain (1998), the sample is relatively 
unbalanced in favor of non crisis periods to crisis periods. Thus, choosing a threshold of 
50% would underestimate the predictive power of the EWS model. This is why many 
empirical studies have also used the thresholds of 25% and of 20% in order to evaluate the 
forecasting performance of their models. Moreover, as noted in Bussière and Fratzscher 
(2002), Type II errors might be less important for policymakers whose main interest is in 
preventing crises. Thus, the policymakers would certainly find less costly to implement 
preemptive measures while the predicted crisis does not occur, than not to implement such 
defense measures while a non predicted crisis arises which possibly could have been 
prevented or the effect of which could have been lowered by these preemptive policies. 
This is why the policymakers could tolerate more false alarms and might prefer a lower 
threshold value, contrary to the private investors whose aim is in predicting the next crisis 
of a particular country more accurately, so they might choose a higher cut-off value.  
 
Table 2. The trade-off problem  
 Crisis within the forecasting horizon (1 
to 24 months),  
1tC =  
No crisis  within the forecasting horizon (1 
to 24 months),  
0tC =  
Signal issued, 
1tS =   
A  B  (Type II error) 
No signal issued, 
0tS =  
C  (Type I error) D  
 
The private investors and the policymakers also differentiate one from the other for their 
preference of the forecasting horizon length. Since the policymakers are interested in 
preventing of crises, they favor a relatively long prediction window (from 12 to 24 months) 
that may give sufficient time to the authorities for taking some preventive measures. 
Meanwhile, the private investors prefer a shorter horizon (from 1 to 3 months) in order to 
adjust their portfolios to the foreign exchange risks. 
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IV. The model 
IV.1. Methodology and the crisis index 
 
I consider that the logit/probit approach seems more adapted for the construction of an 
EWS model since it evaluates directly the conditional probability of a crisis given a set of 
early warning indicators and also lends itself to standard statistical tests that evaluate 
robustness of the estimation results. The estimated logit model takes then the following 
form: 
 
(8) ( ) ( )1 1Prob t t tC X F Xβ β− −=  
 
where the crisis probability 1tC =  is estimated one month before the occurrence of a crisis, 
conditional on a set of 16 one-month lagged explanatory variables 1tX − . F  corresponds 
here to the logistic cumulative distribution function where the probability of a crisis is 
calculated according to the equation (6). In the framework of a logit model, the right-hand 
side is constrained to 0 or 1 and is then compared to the observed value of the binary crisis 
variable tC . 
 
Since the crisis is a discrete event, I construct a latent crisis variable which takes the form 
of an index of speculative pressure 1ISP . This crisis index which is naturally dependent 
variable of the multivariate logit model defines the crisis as an episode of speculative 
pressure on the foreign exchange market. In this sense, the crisis index takes into account 
both the situations where speculative attacks lead to currency devaluation and where the 
authorities successfully defend the currency by intervening in the foreign exchange market 
and/or rising domestic interest rates. The index is composed of the monthly real exchange 
rate changes, the international reserves changes and the nominal interest rate changes, 
weighted by the inverse of their respective standard deviations. The crisis index increases 
with a depreciation of the domestic exchange rate, a significant loss of international 
reserves and a considerable rise of the interest rate. 
 
(9) ( )1 1 1
1 1
1 1 11 t t t tt t t
RER t RES t NIR
RER RER RES RESISP NIR NIR
RER RESσ σ σ
− −
−
− −
   
− −
= − + −   
   
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where ( )* /RER NER P P= × , 
RER = Real exchange rate (an increase corresponds to a real depreciation of the 
domestic currency), 
NER = Nominal exchange rate (TL/USD). Data gathered from the IMF 
International Financial Statistics (IFS, January 2006, IFS line 186.AE, 
*P = Consumer prices index US, IFS line 11164, 
P = Consumer prices index Turkey, IFS line 18664, 
RES = International reserves – Gold (in USD), IFS line 186.1L.D, 
NIR = Nominal interest rate, IFS line 18660L, 
  ,  , RER RER RERσ σ σ  = Standard deviations of the components of the index. 
 
Any month when the values of the index 1ISP  exceeds a specified threshold equal to the 
index mean 1ISPµ  plus three standard deviations of the index 13 ISPσ  is classified as crisis 
episode.10 
 
(10) 1 11  if  1 >3  
0  otherwise
t ISP ISP
t
ISP
C
σ µ+
= 

 
 
The index 1ISP  at the threshold of three standard deviations above the index mean 
correctly identifies the exact timing of the April 1994 and February 2001 Turkish crises as 
shown on Figure 2. I also define three more thresholds, respectively set to 1.5, 2 and 2.5 
standard deviations above the index mean in order to illustrate the sensitivity of the crisis 
dating mechanism to the changing arbitrary threshold levels in terms of standard 
deviations. The index 1ISP  identifies at any threshold level the April 1994 and February 
2001 crises. However, since I have not defined an exclusion window, the April 1994 and 
February 2001 crises are detected more than once as if they are different crisis episodes at 
                                                 
10
 Many modelers like Eichengreen et al. (1996) or Frankel and Rose (1996) inter alia use a crisis-window (or 
exclusion window) of 3 to 36 months length. This means that they discard a second (or subsequent) crisis 
observation identified by crisis index which occur within given proximity to the first crisis. In other words, 
they define as crisis, not only the crisis month, but also all the period of the crisis-window. Bussière and 
Fratzscher (2002) justify adoption of a crisis-window by the difficulty to predict the exact timing of a crisis 
rather than to predict whether a crisis will occur within a specific time horizon. I have not defined a crisis-
window within the framework of this paper. 
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the threshold levels below three standard deviations. I observe that as expected the higher 
the value of the threshold, the lower the number of identified crises. 
 
Figure 1. The crisis index ISP1 
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Figure 2. The exact timing of the Turkish crises identified by the index ISP1 at different threshold 
levels 
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I also adopt two other currency crisis definitions 2ISP  and 3ISP  in order to illustrate the 
sensitivity of the crisis dates to the changing crisis definitions. The index 2ISP  thus is a 
weighted average of the monthly real exchange rate changes and of the international 
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reserves changes, excluding the nominal interest rate changes, while the index 3ISP  is 
only composed of the monthly real exchange rate changes. 
 
(11) 1 1
1 1
1 12 t t t tt
RER t RES t
RER RER RES RESISP
RER RESσ σ
− −
− −
   
− −
= −   
   
 
(12) 1
1
3 t tt
t
RER RERISP
RER
−
−
−
=  
 
Figure 3. The crisis indexes ISP2 and ISP3 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the crisis indexes  
Index Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis Max. Normality 
(T=155) 
ADF (T=151,  
C: 5%= -3.4 
C:1%= -4.0) 
Lags  0 1 
ISP1 0.0058 0.905 1.982 11.854 5.178 Chi2=58.71 
[0.00]** 
-11.10** 7.97** 
 
ISP2 0.0069 0.570 1.713 11.619 3.492 Chi2=75.16 
[0.00]** 
-10.79** -8.10** 
ISP3 0.00058 0.0481 1.713 11.619 0.2944 Chi2=75.16 
[0.00]** 
-10.78** -8.30** 
 
As one may easily observe on Figures 1 and 3, the three different crisis indexes correctly 
detect the Turkish crisis episodes. Nevertheless, the means and standard deviations of the 
indexes diverge across crisis definitions. The normality (chi-square) and stationnarity 
(Augmented Dickey-Fuller, ADF) tests presented in Table 3 highlight that each index is 
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normally distributed and stationary as the unit root null hypothesis of the ADF test is 
rejected at the 5% level. As for the identified crisis episodes at different threshold levels, 
the three crisis indexes behave very similarly as one may clearly see on Figures 2 and 4. 
This confirms the results of Lestano and Jacobs (2007) who found that the number and 
dates of the crises identified by different crisis definitions had not considerably changed in 
the case of the six Asian countries. That thus weakens some criticisms formulated against 
the characterization of the crises by the construction of the binary crisis indices. 
 
Figure 4. The exact timing of the Turkish crises identified by the indexes ISP2 and ISP3 at different 
threshold levels 
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IV.2. Data description and transformation and explanatory variables 
 
The model is estimated using monthly data from January 1990 to December 2002 in order 
to determine the main factors of the Turkish crises. As stated above, the main reason to 
start the sample period in 1990:01 is due to the important trade and financial liberalization 
process undertaken during the 1980s that radically transformed the Turkish economy. In 
this sense, a selected sample that covers pre- and post-liberalization periods could seriously 
bias the estimation results given the changing volatility of the explanatory variables. 
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The econometric study is also limited to the crises of one country. This one-country 
approach may be criticized as crises are relatively rare events and the main goal of the 
EWS models is to find common fundamentals across various crisis episodes. However, as I 
showed in the previous section, the determinants of the crises change on the one hand from 
one period to another since the modelers adapt their theoretical models to the changing 
nature of the crises (first, second and third generations crisis models) and on the other hand 
from one country to another since some empirical works (Cartapanis et al., 1998, Abiad, 
2003) found few similarities across different crisis episodes. It should also be noted that 
there is a difficulty to define what the homogeneous character that different countries share 
is. Bussière and Fratzscher (2002) cite openness to capital flows as common characteristic 
while composing their country sample, but is that sufficient? 
 
Most data are gathered from the IFS CD-ROM (January 2009) and completed from the 
sources of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT).11 In this paper, I use 
monthly data rather than quarterly or annual data that better capture the sudden nature of 
crises and variance of indicators. Where monthly data are unavailable, I generate the 
monthly series by interpolation or extrapolation via frequency conversion method (Linear 
Match Last) of the EViews software. The explanatory variables of the binomial logit model 
are selected on the basis of the theoretical and empirical currency crisis literature. I explore 
here a broad set of 16 indicators that are classified then into three categories. Note that 
BUDGET , GDP , PSBR , CA , SHORTDEBT , FDI  and PORTINVEST  initially found 
at quarterly or annually frequency are transformed into monthly basis. The ISE  initially 
found at weekly basis is also converted into monthly frequency. Moreover, overvaluation 
of the domestic currency is defined as deviation of the real exchange rate from a Hodrick-
Prescott trend RER hpRER− . TOT  is the ratio of unit value of exports to unit value of 
imports. BLOAN  is composed of bank claims to public and private sectors. BASSET  
includes total bank claims and foreign assets. BLIAB  includes total bank domestic and 
foreign currency liabilities. BRES  includes demand, time and saving deposits. 
BSHORTPOS  is the ratio of bank foreign assets to foreign liabilities. 
                                                 
11
 The CBRT provides an electronic data delivery system (EDDS) on its web page www.tcmb.gov.tr. 
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Table 4. Explanatory variables of the model 
Category/Concept Notation Source/Transformation Indicators’ economic interpretation, references and awaited impact on the 
crisis index 
Expected 
Sign 
Public and real sector 
 
-Real sector imbalances 
 
1) Industrial production 
 
 
 
 
2) Istanbul Stock Exchange 
 
 
 
 
3) Inflation 
 
 
 
-Public sector imbalances 
 
4) Budget balance/GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-Monetary imbalances 
 
5) M2/International reserves 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IPROD 
 
 
 
 
ISE 
 
 
 
 
INFL 
 
 
 
 
 
BUDGET/GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M2/RES 
 
 
 
 
 
*IFS18666B 
 
 
 
 
*CBRT 
 
 
 
 
*IFS18664 
 
 
 
 
 
*CBRT/IFS18699B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*IFS18635L/IFS186.1L.D 
 
 
 
 
 
*The periods of economic slowdown often precede currency crisis episodes. 
The growth of industrial production should thus lower the crisis probability. 
Reference: Second generation crisis theory 
 
 
*The collapse of the stock exchange index, which illustrates a massive 
withdrawal of capital flows, can be perceived as a harbinger of the crisis. 
Reference: Second and third generation crisis theory 
 
 
*High inflation rates often lead to increasing interest rates that create negative 
impacts over real and financial sectors. The crisis index should thus react to the 
rise in inflation rates. 
Reference: First and second generation crisis theory 
 
 
*High budget deficits are expected to raise the crisis probability, since they 
reduce available national savings and may lead to high inflation and interest 
rates. This situation increases then the vulnerability to shocks and lowers 
investors’ confidence. 
Reference: First generation crisis theory 
 
 
 
 
*This ratio measures the adequacy of the central bank reserves to cover the 
banking system liabilities in a bank run or a currency crisis, since individuals 
may rush to convert their domestic currency deposits into foreign currency. An 
economy will be all the more vulnerable to a confidence crisis as the ratio of 
money supply to the international reserves is high. 
Reference: First and third generation crisis theory 
 
 
 
 
(-) 
 
 
 
 
(-/+) 
 
 
 
 
(+) 
 
 
 
 
 
(-) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(+) 
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External balance and capital 
flows 
 
-External current imbalances 
 
6) Deviation of the real 
exchange rate from trend 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7) Current account/GDP 
 
 
 
-External indebtedness 
 
8) Short-term foreign 
debt/International reserves 
 
-Composition of capital inflows 
 
9) Foreign direct investments/ 
Portfolio investments 
 
 
 
 
-External shocks 
 
10) Terms of trade 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RER-hpRER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CA/GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
SHORTDEBT/RES 
 
 
 
 
FDI/PORTINVEST 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TOT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*RER = (NER×P*)/P 
NER:IFS186.AE 
P*: IFS11164 
P: IFS18664.  
 
 
 
 
*IFS18678ALD/IFS18699B 
 
 
 
 
 
*CBRT/IFS186.1L.D 
 
 
 
 
*IFS18678BED/IFS18678BGD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*IFS18674.D/IFS18675.D 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*An overvaluation of real exchange rate is believed on the one hand to attract 
short-term foreign capitals, which would contribute to the overheating of the 
domestic economy, and on the other hand to decrease the international 
competitiveness of a country compared to its commercial competitors, that can 
generate unsustainable external positions. Overvalued exchange rate would 
thus imply a rise of the probability of a crisis. 
(Reference: First generation crisis theory 
 
*A rise (fall) in this ratio is generally associated with large external capital 
inflows (outflows). This indicates a diminished (high) probability to devalue 
and thus to lower (increase) the probability of a crisis. 
Reference: First and second generation crisis theory 
 
 
*Higher foreign short-term debt increases vulnerability to liquidity problems, 
thus to a reversal of capital flows and hence raises the crisis probability. 
Reference: Second and third generation crisis theory 
 
 
*The rise in FDIs relative to portfolio investments shows the increasing ability 
of a country to attract long-term capitals, which can be considered as a sign of 
the investors’ confidence to the country’s economic policies. Moreover, the 
rise in FDIs implies financing of current account deficits by much less volatile 
capital flows and should thus lower the crisis probability. 
Reference: Second and third generation crisis theory 
 
 
*Increases in the terms of trade should strengthen a country’s balance of 
payments position and hence lower the probability of a crisis. In addition, a 
country is all the more vulnerable to a deterioration of its terms of trade as it is 
strongly open to international trade. 
Reference: First and second generation crisis theory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(-) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(-) 
 
 
 
 
 
(+) 
 
 
 
 
(-) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(-) 
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11) Nominal US interest rate 
 
 
 
 
NIRUS *IFS11160LC *The probability of a crisis increases in parallel to a rise in US interest rates, 
since the investors would prefer to reallocate their portfolios in favor of more 
stable placements. The domestic country may then record capital outflows 
and/or undergo a rise in external debt repayment costs. 
Reference: Second and third generation crisis theory 
(+) 
 
Financial sector 
 
-Financial fragility 
 
12) Bank loans/Bank deposits 
 
 
 
 
 
13) Bank reserves/Bank assets 
 
 
 
 
14) Bank deposits/M2 
 
 
 
 
15) Bank short position 
 
 
 
 
16) Central bank credit to 
banks/Bank liabilities 
 
 
 
 
BLOAN/BDEPO 
 
 
 
 
 
BRES/BASSET 
 
 
 
 
BDEPO/M2 
 
 
 
 
BSHORTPOS 
 
 
 
 
CBCRED/BLIAB 
 
 
 
 
*from IFS18622A to 
IFS18622G/IFS18624+IFS18625 
 
 
 
 
*IFS18620/18621+from 
IFS18622A to IFS18622G 
 
 
 
*IFS18624+IFS18625/ 
IFS18635L 
 
 
 
*IFS18621/IFS18626C 
 
 
 
 
*IFS18626G/CBRT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*A high loans-to-deposits ratio may indicate an increasing difficulty of the 
banking system to attract additional financial sources and/or an excessive 
growth of bank loans. This leads to increasing banking system fragility with an 
inadequate level of liquidity to respond shocks and to high crisis probability. 
Reference: First and third generation crisis theory 
 
*This rough capital adequacy ratio shows the ability of the banking system to 
face the bank runs. Adverse macroeconomic shocks are then less likely to lead 
to crises in countries where the banking system is liquid. 
Reference: Third generation crisis theory 
 
*The high ratio of bank deposits to M2 indicates the increasing confidence of 
the households and investors in the banking system. The probability of crisis 
should then decrease following the rise in this ratio. 
Reference: Third generation crisis theory 
 
*This ratio shows the ability of the banking system foreign assets to offset its 
foreign liabilities. A fall of this ratio should thus increase the probability of a 
crisis. 
Reference: Third generation crisis theory 
 
*An increase in this ratio may indicate financial weakness, since its purpose is 
to bail-out weak banks and hence should raise the probability of a crisis. 
Reference: Third generation crisis theory 
 
 
 
 
(+) 
 
 
 
 
 
(-) 
 
 
 
 
(-) 
 
 
 
 
(-) 
 
 
 
 
(+) 
Source: Cartapanis et al. (1998), Kamin et al. (2001), Abiad (2003), Lestano, Jacobs and Kuper (2003), Ari and Dagtekin (2007, 2008) and completed by the author. 
 27 
IV.3. Model specification 
 
I first assess stationnarity of the early warning indicators using the ADF unit root test. I find 
that all the 16 indicators are stationary (at level or in variation) as the unit root null hypothesis 
of the ADF test is rejected at the 5% or 10% level. These 16 explanatory variables enter then 
in the econometric analysis with one-month lag (forecast horizon). The choice of one-month 
forecast horizon may be criticized, since some structural problems of the economy should 
have an adverse effect in the long-run contrary to liquidity problems that have rather a short-
term impact (Bussière, 2007). Therefore, using one-month lag for all the variables may bias 
the estimation results. The choice of a short horizon is also inappropriate from the perspective 
of policymakers who favor a relatively long forecast horizon (from 12 to 24 months) in order 
to have sufficient time for taking preventive measures. It is nevertheless clear that monthly 
data capture better the sudden and brutal nature of crises. This is why I prefer one-month 
lagged explanatory variables. However, I also use different lags (3, 6 and 12 months) in order 
to test how far in advance the model correctly predicts Turkish crisis episodes. 
 
As I classified the 16 indicators into three categories, I initially estimate the model with the 
indicators of the each category and then estimate the “final” model with the economically 
(correctly signed) and statistically significant indicators. There are two main reasons for 
adopting this approach; first avoiding or at least limiting multicolinierarity risk among a broad 
set of 16 indicators and second increasing the robustness of the final model by estimating it 
with only significant indicators. This approach also allows illustrating what the essential 
determinants of the Turkish crises are: public sector imbalance, financial liberalization (or 
capital flows) or banking sector fragility. Moreover, it should be noted that I test the forecast 
performance of each group of indicators at 50%, 25% and 20% threshold levels. Finally, I 
assess the out-of-sample forecast performance of the logit model by estimating the model in a 
sample that covers January 2003-December 2008 period.12 
 
                                                 
12
 Note that, in order to demonstrate that significance of the estimation results is not crisis indicator-dependent 
1ISP , I also estimate two other logit models by using 2ISP  and 3ISP  as dependent crisis variable. I find that 
the estimation results do not indicate any major difference in terms of the significance of the explanatory 
variables compared to the final model of the econometric analysis. They also reach to predict the 1994 and 2001 
Turkish crises at 25% and 20% threshold levels. The estimation results of the models using 2ISP  and 3ISP  as 
dependent crisis variable are available upon request. 
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V. Estimation results 
V.I. First estimations 
 
The Tables 5, 6 and 7 illustrate on the one hand the results of the successive logit models 
estimated with each category of one-month lagged early warning indicators, and on the other 
hand the forecast performance (goodness-of-fit) of these models. 
 
Table 5. The public and real sector variables 
Dependent Variable: ISP1>3SD / Sample (adjusted): 1990M03 2002M12 – 154 Observations 
Variable Coeff. Std. error z-Stat. Prob. 
C -4.709463 0.939276 -5.013929 0.0000 
DIPROD¹ 0.134204 0.159241 0.842772 0.3994 
DISE 0.000477 0.000515 0.925570 0.3547 
DINFL -0.689701 0.663105 -1.040108 0.2983 
BUDGET/GDP -38.01572 30.06430 -1.990757 0.0968 
M2/RES 9.125319 7.949217 1.747952 0.1010 
Mean dependent variable 0.012987 Std. deviation of dependent variable 0.113588 
Std. error of regression 0.087576 Akaike 0.094932 
Log likelihood -3.309749 Schwarz 0.173814 
Restr. log likelihood -10.67457 Hannan-Quinn 0.126973 
Avg. log likelihood -0.021492 LR stat. (5 variables) 8.702964 
Prob. (LR stat.) 0.002063 McFadden R² 0.489941 
Observations: Dep=0 / 1  152 / 2 Total 154 
¹D before a variable indicates its first difference. 
 
Prediction evaluation (cut-off C = 0.5) 
 Estimated prob. 
 Dep=0 Dep=1 Total 
P(Dep=1)≤C 152 2 154 
P(Dep=1)>C 0 0 0 
Total 152 2 154 
Correct 152 0 152 
% Correct 100.00 0.00 98.70 
% Incorrect 0.00 100.00 1.30 
Prediction evaluation (cut-off C = 0.25) 
P(Dep=1)≤C 152 1 153 
P(Dep=1)>C 0 1 1 
Total 152 2 154 
Correct 152 1 153 
% Correct 100.00 50.00 99.35 
% Incorrect 0.00 50.00 0.65 
Prediction evaluation (cut-off C = 0.2) 
P(Dep=1)≤C 151 1 152 
P(Dep=1)>C 1 1 2 
Total 152 2 154 
Correct 151 1 152 
% Correct 99.34 50.00 98.70 
% Incorrect 0.66 50.00 1.30 
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Figure 5. Evolution of the public and real sector variables 
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One easily observes in Table 5 that the indicators IPROD , INFL  and ISE  are neither 
correctly signed nor statically significant contrary to the indicators /BUDGET GDP  and 
2 /M RES . I thus exclude them from the final model. The positive sign of the IPROD  which 
indicates that the industrial production growth increases the probability of a crisis in the 
Turkish economy is not very surprising as one may see a high economic growth trend before 
the outbreak of the Turkish crises. One hence affirms that the Turkish crises do have tendency 
to occur at the end of the economic overheating cycle. However, the insignificance of INFL  
ISE  are quite surprising, since high chronic inflation rates were one of the main problems of 
the Turkish economy in the last three decades and as one may see on the above Figure 5 that 
the ISE Index recorded a sharp fall just before the outbreak of the Turkish crises. On the other 
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hand, /BUDGET GDP  is correctly signed and significant at the 10% level as well as 
2 /M RES . High public deficits and high money growth relative to international reserves due 
to monetization of public deficits at the end of 1993 and to non-sterilization of capital inflows 
during 2000 are then two main factors of the Turkish crises. Moreover, this logit model using 
the Quadratic hill climbing method is quite robust as the McFadden R² is above 48% (very 
rare for a logit model of which the R² ratio is generally around 20% to 40%) and LR statistic 
probability is below the 1%. Nevertheless, the model reaches only to predict the 2001 Turkish 
crisis at the 25% cut-off level signaling a false crisis alarm as well. 
 
As indicated in Table 6, the indicators /CA GDP  and NIRUS  do not have expected signs on 
the crisis index and statistical significance, hence they are excluded from the final model. The 
indicator /FDI PORTINVEST  is correctly signed, but it is not statistically significant, 
exceeding the 10% probability level, thus it is not included into the final model either, 
contrary to the indicators RER hpRER− , /SHORTDEBT RES  and TOT . The insignificance 
of /CA GDP  is also quite surprising, since the current account deficit had reached to 5% of 
GDP in the year preceding the Turkish crises. The insignificance of NIRUS  may lead one to 
affirm that the external shocks had a limited impact on the occurrence of Turkish crises, but 
the high significance of TOT  weakens this statement. The insignificance of 
/FDI PORTINVEST  is not very unexpected as the long-term investment to the Turkish 
economy had never exceeded one-billion USD per year in spite of trade and financial 
liberalization efforts implemented during the 1980s. One may see only after the severe 2001 
financial crisis that huge long-term capital inflows accelerated towards to the Turkish 
economy, particularly for the acquisition of the domestic banks transferred to the SDIF and of 
the highly profitable state-owned-enterprises (SES) like Turk Telekom, Tekel, Petkim etc. 
 
One the other hand, RER hpRER−  which represents the deviation of the real exchange rate 
from trend, is quite significant. In the both Turkish crisis episodes, one may see real currency 
appreciation of around 10% generally due to short-term capital inflows. The domestic 
currency overvaluation before the outbreak of the 2001 crisis can also be explained by 
implementation of the exchange-rate-based stabilization program. As detailed in Calvo and 
Végh (1999) and Rodrik and Velasco (1999), these programs generate, like in the Turkish 
example, an initial consumption boom that contributes a high economic growth, but to the 
detriment of real currency appreciation and of unsustainable commercial and current account 
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deficits. This is followed then by a stage of liquidity squeeze which leads to sharp increases in 
interest rates and forces later the government to realign its currency rate. The indebtedness 
indicator /SHORTDEBT RES  is also correctly signed and quite significant. This ratio which 
reaches to 250% and 150% respectively before the outbreak of the 1994 and 2001 Turkish 
crises indicate the increasing vulnerability of the Turkish economy to external shocks, a 
reversal of capital inflows and a liquidity crisis. Besides, the logit model is robust as the 
McFadden R² is above 49% and LR statistic probability is below the 5% level. However the 
model predicts only the 1994 Turkish crisis, not the 2001 one. 
 
Figure 6. Evolution of the external balance and capital flows variables 
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Table 6. The external balance and capital flows variables 
Dependent Variable: ISP1>3SD / Sample (adjusted): 1990M03 2002M12 – 154 Observations 
Variable Coeff. Std. error z-Stat. Prob. 
C -16.32039 7.857995 -2.076915 0.0378 
RER-hpRER -40.07275 26.22353 -1.928122 0.0865 
CA/GDP 54.68034 374.7998 0.145892 0.8840 
SHORTDEBT/RES 4.565086 2.511774 1.817475 0.0691 
FDI/PORTINVEST -0.038929 0.023868 -0.931034 0.2529 
TOT -45.02369 32.49055 -1.615747 0.1058 
DNIRUS -4.727027 5.433952 -0.869906 0.3844 
Mean dependent variable 0.012903 Std. deviation of dependent variable 0.113223 
Std. error of regression 0.105384 Akaike 0.146493 
Log likelihood -5.353197 Schwarz 0.264303 
Restr. log likelihood -10.68760 Hannan-Quinn 0.194345 
Avg. log likelihood 0.034537 LR stat. (6 variables) 10.66880- 
Prob. (LR stat.) 0.058357 McFadden R² 0.499121 
Observations: Dep=0 /1  152 / 2 Total 154 
 
 
Prediction evaluation (cut-off C = 0.5) 
 Estimated prob. 
 Dep=0 Dep=1 Total 
P(Dep=1)≤C 151 1 152 
P(Dep=1)>C 1 1 2 
Total 152 2 154 
Correct 151 1 152 
% Correct 99.34 50.00 98.70 
% Incorrect 0.66 50.00 1.30 
Prediction evaluation (cut-off C = 0.25) 
P(Dep=1)≤C 151 1 152 
P(Dep=1)>C 1 1 2 
Total 152 2 154 
Correct 151 1 152 
% Correct 99.34 50.00 98.70 
% Incorrect 0.66 50.00 1.30 
Prediction evaluation (cut-off C = 0.2) 
P(Dep=1)≤C 151 1 152 
P(Dep=1)>C 1 1 2 
Total 152 2 154 
Correct 151 1 152 
% Correct 99.34 50.00 98.70 
% Incorrect 0.66 50.00 1.30 
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Table 7. The financial sector variables 
Dependent Variable: ISP1>3SD / Sample (adjusted): 1990M02 2002M12 – 155 Observations 
Variable Coeff. Std. error z-Stat. Prob. 
C -6.082985 1.769755 -3.437191 0.0006 
BLOAN/BDEPO 6.079142 15.02239 0.404672 0.6857 
BRES/BASSET 20.00708 17.08105 1.162729 0.2449 
BDEPO/M2 -0.371116 9.999737 -0.037113 0.9704 
BSHORTPOS -10.32351 7.769934 -1.328648 0.1840 
CBCRED/BLIAB -79.51412 39.29049 -1.023750 0.2130 
Mean dependent variable 0.012987 Std. deviation of dependent variable 0.113588 
Std. error of regression 0.110350 Akaike 0.177222 
Log likelihood -7.646090 Schwarz 0.295545 
Restr. log likelihood -10.67457 Hannan-Quinn 0.225284 
Avg. log likelihood -0.049650 LR stat. (5 variables) 6.056955 
Prob. (LR stat.) 0.300716 McFadden R² 0.223710 
Observations: Dep=0 /1  153 / 2 Total 155 
 
 
Prediction evaluation (cut-off C = 0.5) 
 Estimated prob. 
 Dep=0 Dep=1 Total 
P(Dep=1)≤C 153 2 155 
P(Dep=1)>C 0 0 0 
Total 153 2 155 
Correct 153 0 153 
% Correct 100.00 0.00 98.71 
% Incorrect 0.00 100.00 1.29 
Prediction evaluation (cut-off C = 0.25) 
P(Dep=1)≤C 153 2 155 
P(Dep=1)>C 0 0 0 
Total 153 2 155 
Correct 153 0 153 
% Correct 100.00 0.00 98.71 
% Incorrect 0.00 100.00 1.29 
Prediction evaluation (cut-off C = 0.2) 
P(Dep=1)≤C 152 2 154 
P(Dep=1)>C 1 0 1 
Total 153 2 155 
Correct 152 0 152 
% Correct 99.34 0.00 98.71 
% Incorrect 0.66 100.00 1.29 
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Figure 7. Evolution of the financial sector variables 
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As shown in Table 7, the indicators /BRES BASSET  and /CBCRED BLIAB  do not have 
economic and statistical significance contrary to the indicators /BLOAN BDEPO , 
/ 2BDEPO M  and BSHORTPOS  that are correctly signed, but are not statistically 
significant. On the other hand, the logit model estimated with only financial fragility variables 
is not robust either, as the McFadden R² is around 20% and LR statistic probability are above 
the 10% level. Moreover, the model does not reach to predict any of the Turkish crises. These 
disappointing results, probably due to the colinearity problems among the financial sector 
indicators, lead me to construct a financial fragility index IFF  as a weighted average of 
monthly changes in banking sector loans to private sector, in banking sector foreign liabilities 
and in banking sector deposits. This index increases with a sharp growth in bank loans to the 
private sector (measuring credit risk), a considerable rise in bank foreign liabilities 
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(measuring currency risk) and a significant fall of bank deposits (following a bank run for 
example).13 
 
(13) 1 1
1 1
1 1t t t t
t
BLOAN t BDEPO t
BLOAN BLOAN BDEPO BDEPOIFF
BLOAN BDEPOσ σ
− −
− −
   
− −
= − +   
   
 
    
1
1
1 t t
t
BFXLIAB t
BFXLIAB BFXLIAB
BFXLIAB
ε
σ
−
−
 
−
+ 
 
 
 
where BLOAN = Banks loans granted to private sector, IFS line 18622D, 
BDEPO = Banks deposits, IFS line 18624+IFS line 18625, 
BFXLIAB = Banks foreign liabilities, 
BLOANσ , BDEPOσ , BFXLIABσ = Standard deviations of the components of the index. 
 
Figure 8. Evolution of the financial fragility index IFF 
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V.2. Estimation results of the final model 
 
The final logit model which is estimated with 5 significant indicators of the previous models 
and IFF , confirms my initial intuitions that the 1994 and 2001 Turkish crises are due to 
combination of different macroeconomic imbalances (high budget deficits, high money 
supply growths, real exchange rate appreciation and high short-term foreign debt stocks), of 
banking sector weaknesses (increasing credit and currency risks) and of external shocks 
                                                 
13
 Actually, this index is inspired from Kibritcioglu’s (2002) banking sector fragility indicator. 
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(terms of trade). On the other hand, the model is very robust as the ratio R² is above 80% and 
predicts correctly both Turkish crises at 25% and 20% cut-off level while it only sends two 
false alarms. (See also appendix for the forecast figures of the consecutive logit models). 
 
Table 9. The crisis indicators of the final model 
Dependent Variable: ISP1>3SD / Sample (adjusted): 1990M03 2002M12 – 154 Observations 
Variable Coeff. Std. error z-Stat. Prob. 
C -34.59522 29.79916 -1.160946 0.2457 
BUDGET/GDP -31.10227 23.06038 -1.905757 0.0651 
M2/RES 5.621488 4.600233 1.293155 0.1406 
RER-hpRER -35.22090 18.60615 -1.892971 0.0584 
SHORTDEBT/RES 5.241099 2.551735 2.053935 0.0400 
TOT -38.55529 25.59744 -1.706217 0.0920 
IFF 1.010604 0.360812 2.800914 0.0051 
Mean dependent variable 0.012987 Std. deviation of dependent variable 0.113588 
Std. error of regression 0.065310 Akaike 0.074781 
Log likelihood -1.758105 Schwarz 0.113662 
Restr. log likelihood -10.67457 Hannan-Quinn 0.106822 
Avg. log likelihood -0.011416 LR stat. (6 variables) 17.83293 
Prob. (LR stat.) 0.000476 McFadden R² 0.835300 
Observations : Dep=0 /1  152 / 2 Total 154 
 
 
Prediction evaluation (cut-off C = 0.5) 
 Estimated prob. 
 Dep=0 Dep=1 Total 
P(Dep=1)≤C Dep=0 Dep=1 Total 
P(Dep=1)>C 152 1 153 
Total 0 1 1 
Correct 152 2 154 
% Correct 152 1 153 
% Incorrect 100.00 50.00 99.35 
Prediction evaluation (cut-off C = 0.25) 
P(Dep=1)≤C 151 0 151 
P(Dep=1)>C 1 2 3 
Total 152 2 154 
Correct 151 2 153 
% Correct 99.34 100.00 99.35 
% Incorrect 0.66 0.00 0.65 
Prediction evaluation (cut-off C = 0.2) 
P(Dep=1)≤C 151 0 151 
P(Dep=1)>C 1 2 3 
Total 152 2 154 
Correct 151 2 153 
% Correct 99.34 100.00 99.35 
% Incorrect 0.66 0.00 0.65 
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V.3. Results of the models estimated with three-, six- and twelve-month lagged 
indicators 
 
In this section, I aim to demonstrate how far in advance the model correctly predicts Turkish 
crisis episodes. In this sense, I estimate successive logit models with three ( 3t − )-, six ( 6t − )- 
and twelve-month ( 12t − ) lagged early warning indicators while the dependent crisis variable 
remains at t . I follow again the same approach of estimating logit models with each category 
of indicators and then estimating the final models with the economically and statistically 
significant indicators. The below Tables 10, 11 and 12 illustrate the estimation results of these 
successive logit models regressed with lagged indicators. 
 
Table 10. The external balance and capital flows variables at different lags 
Dependent variable: ISP1>3SD / Sample (adjusted): 1990M05 2002M12 – 152 Observations 
Variable Coeff. Std. error z-Stat. Prob. 
C -3.426344 19.30713 -0.177465 0.8591 
RER-hpRER_3 -28.30680 17.01282 -1.530045 0.1017 
CA/GDP_3 -63.55546 283.2227 -0.224401 0.8224 
SHORTDEBT/RES_3 3.976889 2.333258 1.704437 0.0883 
FDI/PORTINVEST_3 0.117487 0.107456 1.051721 0.1986 
TOT_3 -17.88634 5.352700 -3.341554 0.0008 
DNIRUS_3 -5.785965 6.320475 -0.915432 0.3600 
Sample (adjusted): 1990M08 2002M12 – 149 Observations 
C 7.473560 16.05613 0.465465 0.6416 
RER-hpRER_6 -45.68384 26.26644 -1.739247 0.0820 
CA/GDP_6 35.01585 31.05767 0.804845 0.4209 
SHORTDEBT/RES_6 2.354051 1.579943 1.852192 0.0605 
FDI/PORTINVEST_6 -0.004381 0.062276 -0.070346 0.9439 
TOT_6 -15.42475 11.30994 -1.891092 0.0729 
DNIRUS_6 3.109453 2.406261 1.630015 0.0965 
Sample (adjusted): 1991M02 2002M12 – 143 Observations 
C -40.28128 27.82585 -1.447621 0.1477 
RER-hpRER_12 -79.74983 50.09384 -1.592009 0.1014 
CA/GDP_12 -51.08556 37.01844 -1.584367 0.0862 
SHORTDEBT/RES_12 -5.150785 5.169965 -0.996290 0.3191 
FDI/PORTINVEST_12 0.029575 0.109115 0.271041 0.7864 
TOT_12 -34.47890 27.94638 -1.433752 0.1031 
DNIRUS_12 4.736415 4.021526 1.567526 0.0749 
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Table 11. The public and real sector variables at different lags 
Dependent variable: ISP1>3SD / Sample (adjusted): 1990M05 2002M12 – 152 Observations 
Variable Coeff. Std. error z-Stat. Prob. 
C -8.274106 3.535651 -2.340193 0.0193 
DIPROD_3 -0.026647 0.144799 -0.184027 0.8540 
DISE_3 -0.000355 0.000819 -0.433330 0.6648 
DINFL_3 0.090938 0.259649 0.350235 0.7262 
BUDGET/GDP_3 -54.61167 33.83731 -1.613948 0.1065 
M2/RES_3 1.882979 0.903286 1.672519 0.0983 
Sample (adjusted): 1990M08 2002M12 – 149 Observations 
C -3.585450 2.223727 -1.612360 0.1069 
DIPROD_6 0.037153 0.148318 0.250493 0.8022 
DISE_6 -0.000597 0.000987 -0.604991 0.5452 
DINFL_6 -0.093735 0.452563 -0.207121 0.8359 
BUDGET/GDP_6 -43.61881 45.26051 -0.457890 0.6470 
M2/RES_6 -0.257510 0.778764 -0.330665 0.7409 
Sample (adjusted): 1991M02 2002M12 – 143 Observations 
C -12.78800 7.351222 -1.739575 0.0819 
DIPROD_12 1.103921 0.733690 1.054615 0.2324 
DISE_12 -0.005403 0.003212 -1.482545 0.0997 
DINFL_12 -2.298823 1.380661 -0.545572 0.2106 
BUDGET/GDP_12 64.07862 42.31994 1.157211 0.2472 
M2/RES_12 1.734622 2.503640 0.852026 0.5854 
 
Table 12. The financial sector indicators at different lags 
Dependent variable: ISP1>3SD / Sample (adjusted): 1990M04 2002M12 – 153 Observations 
Variable Coeff. Std. error z-Stat. Prob. 
C -7.679068 15.33681 -0.500695 0.6166 
BLOAN/BDEPO_3 8.937415 7.604825 1.175230 0.2399 
BRES/BASSET_3 -32.86394 76.59535 -0.429059 0.6679 
BDEPO/M2_3 -7.430916 6.904013 -1.076318 0.2818 
BSHORTPOS_3 3.769296 5.651172 0.666994 0.5048 
CBCRED/BLIAB_3 3.995997 26.50873 0.150743 0.8802 
Sample (adjusted): 1990M07 2002M12 – 150 Observations 
C 5.576106 18.70582 0.298095 0.7656 
BLOAN/BDEPO_6 6.463196 9.760415 0.662184 0.5079 
BRES/BASSET_6 18.49912 85.47018 0.216439 0.8286 
BDEPO/M2_6 -7.218589 7.397369 -0.975832 0.3291 
BSHORTPOS_6 -9.757101 11.42294 -0.854167 0.3930 
CBCRED/BLIAB_6 -36.50266 55.36076 -0.659360 0.5097 
Sample (adjusted): 1991M01 2002M12 – 144 Observations 
C 30.61940 28.93251 1.058304 0.2899 
BLOAN/BDEPO_12 -15.36407 10.74148 -1.430350 0.1526 
BRES/BASSET_12 -61.16141 125.9541 -0.485585 0.6273 
BDEPO/M2_12 4.035552 8.180150 0.493335 0.6218 
BSHORTPOS_12 -8.329869 8.264133 -1.007954 0.3135 
CBCRED/BLIAB_12 25.83621 29.81381 0.866585 0.3862 
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According to the estimation results of the models, some indicators do have short-term impact 
( /BUDGET GDP , 2 /M RES  or /SHORTDEBT RES ) while some others do have rather 
mid- or long-term impact ( ISE , /CA GDP  or NIRUS ) on the crisis probability. Moreover, 
some indicators are in general economically and statistically significant whatever the lag is 
used ( RER hpRER−  or TOT ) while some others are never economically and statistically 
significant ( IPROD , INFL , /FDI PORTINVEST ). 
 
After illustrating economic and statistical significance of the early warning indicators at 
different lags, I evaluate now the forecast performance of the final models estimated only with 
significant indicators. Firstly, as shown in Table 13, one may clearly observe that 6 indicators 
( /BUDGET GDP , 2 /M RES , RER hpRER− , /SHORTDEBT RES , TOT , IFF ) that are 
significant at one month lag, are also significant at three month lag. This means that the 
Turkish economy was already vulnerable three months before the outbreak of the crises that 
the model reaches to correctly signal at 20% threshold level. Secondly, the estimation results 
of the logit model regressed with six-month lagged significant indicators (Table 14) indicate 
that NIRUS  becomes economically and statistically significant for the first time. The 
indicators RER hpRER− , /SHORTDEBT RES , TOT  and IFF  are still significant contrary 
to /BUDGET GDP  and 2 /M RES  that do not form part of the final model. Besides, the 
model continues to correctly signal the increasing crisis probability six months before the 
occurrence of the 1994 and 2001 Turkish crises at 20% threshold level crisis. Lastly, as 
illustrated in Table 15, /SHORTDEBT RES , one of the key indicators of the logit model, 
does not form part of the final model estimated with twelve-month lagged variables. The 
indicators ISE  and /CA GDP  become economically and statistically significant for the first 
time and the indicators RER hpRER− , TOT  and IFF  do have again economic and statistical 
significance. Moreover, the model correctly predicts the occurrence of the 1994 and 2001 
Turkish crises at 20% cut-off level. Actually, the prediction of the 1994 crisis is not very 
surprising as Ozatay (1996, 1999) states that the Turkish government was already insolvent as 
for the end of 1992. However, signalling of the 2001 crisis twelve months before its 
occurrence is quite surprising since the Turkish government had implemented an exchange-
rate based stabilization programme in January 2000. This may be explained by the fact that 
the Turkish economy was showing some signs of economic and financial vulnerability at the 
end of the 1998-1999 period that forced the government to sign a stand-by agreement with the 
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IMF. One may then state that the implementation of the stabilization programme reduced the 
riskiness of the Turkish economy, without nonetheless being able to prevent the occurrence of 
the crisis in early 2001. This result should encourage the construction of the EWS models of 
which main objective is to inform the monetary authorities about the vulnerability of the 
economy so that they take necessary pre-emptive measures. 
 
Table 13. The final model estimated with three-month lagged crisis indicators 
Dependent variable: ISP1>3SD / Sample (adjusted): 1990M05 2002M12 – 152 Observations 
Variable Coeff. Std. error z-Stat. Prob. 
C -8.582021 4.864199 -1.764324 0.0777 
BUDGET/GDP_3 -59.78419 32.21310 -2.166329 0.0303 
M2/RES_3 2.477013 1.582755 1.124274 0.1562 
RER-hpRER_3 -69.07755 34.16718 -1.677932 0.0811 
SHORTDEBT/RES_3 5.738344 2.761176 2.078225 0.0377 
TOT_3 -23.55810 16.24262 -1.450388 0.0970 
IFF_3 1.104251 0.426723 1.908148 0.0564 
Mean dependent variable 0.013158 Std. deviation of dependent variable 0.114327 
Std. error of regression 0.077872 Akaike 0.128970 
Log likelihood -2.801750 Schwarz 0.268228 
Restr. log likelihood -10.64825 Hannan-Quinn 0.185542 
Avg. log likelihood -0.018433 LR stat. (6 variables) 15.69300 
Prob. (LR stat.) 0.015500 McFadden R² 0.736882 
Observations : Dep=0 /1  150 / 2 Total 152 
 
Prediction evaluation (cut-off C = 0.5) 
 Estimated prob. 
 Dep=0 Dep=1 Total 
P(Dep=1)≤C 150 1 151 
P(Dep=1)>C 0 1 1 
Total 150 2 152 
Correct 150 1 151 
% Correct 100.00 50.00 99.34 
% Incorrect 0.00 50.00 0.66 
Prediction evaluation (cut-off C = 0.25) 
P(Dep=1)≤C 149 1 150 
P(Dep=1)>C 1 1 2 
Total 150 2 152 
Correct 149 1 150 
% Correct 99.33 50.00 98.68 
% Incorrect 0.67 50.00 1.32 
Prediction evaluation (cut-off C = 0.2) 
P(Dep=1)≤C 148 0 148 
P(Dep=1)>C 2 2 2 
Total 150 2 152 
Correct 148 2 150 
% Correct 98.30 100.00 98.13 
% Incorrect 1.70 0.00 1.97 
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Table 14. The final model estimated with six-month lagged crisis indicators 
Dependent variable: ISP1>3SD / Sample (adjusted): 1990M08 2002M12 – 149 Observations 
Variable Coeff. Std. error z-Stat. Prob. 
C -8.868939 3.927648 -2.258079 0.0239 
RER-hpRER_6 -53.37847 36.38706 -1.666963 0.0924 
SHORTDEBT/RES_6 3.666596 1.108981 1.601088 0.1059 
TOT_6 -33.13404 25.80706 -1.310205 0.1301 
DNIRUS_6 6.213295 4.620204 1.727874 0.0795 
IFF_6 1.207451 0.714632 1.850019 0.0353 
Mean dependent variable 0.013423 Std. deviation of dependent variable 0.115082 
Std. error of regression 0.111102 Akaike 0.151873 
Log likelihood -5.990390 Schwarz 0.292369 
Restr. log likelihood -10.60811 Hannan-Quinn 0.208952 
Avg. log likelihood -0.040204 LR stat. (5 variables) 9.235450 
Prob. (LR stat.) 0.415830 McFadden R² 0.535301 
Observations : Dep=0 /1  147 / 2 Total 149 
 
 
 
 
Prediction evaluation (cut-off C = 0.5) 
 Estimated prob. 
 Dep=0 Dep=1 Total 
P(Dep=1)≤C 146 1 147 
P(Dep=1)>C 1 1 2 
Total 147 2 149 
Correct 146 1 147 
% Correct 99.32 50.00 98.66 
% Incorrect 0.68 50.00 1.34 
Prediction evaluation (cut-off C = 0.25) 
P(Dep=1)≤C 146 1 147 
P(Dep=1)>C 1 1 2 
Total 147 2 149 
Correct 146 1 147 
% Correct 99.32 50.00 98.66 
% Incorrect 0.68 50.00 1.34 
Prediction evaluation (cut-off C = 0.2) 
P(Dep=1)≤C 145 0 145 
P(Dep=1)>C 2 2 4 
Total 147 2 149 
Correct 145 2 147 
% Correct 98.64 100.00 98.66 
% Incorrect 1.36 0.00 1.34 
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Table 15. The final model estimated with twelve-month lagged crisis indicators 
Dependent variable: ISP1>3SD / Sample (adjusted): 1991M02 2002M12 – 143 Observations 
Variable Coeff. Std. error z-Stat. Prob. 
C -25.78749 15.62668 -1.565891 0.1174 
DISE_12 -0.003772 0.002394 -1.575334 0.1152 
RER-hpRER_12 -33.84496 16.13256 -1.736689 0.0689 
CA/GDP_12 -32.20064 15.90156 -2.009257 0.0272 
TOT_12 -39.36170 26.65560 -1.476676 0.1098 
DNIRUS_12 13.41450 10.42751 1.586453 0.0983 
IFF_12 0.826694 0.346368 1.931910 0.0280 
Mean dependent variable 0.014085 Std. deviation of dependent variable 0.118257 
Std. error of regression 0.081690 Akaike 0.109665 
Log likelihood -2.786212 Schwarz 0.213743 
Restr. log likelihood -10.51121 Hannan-Quinn 0.151958 
Avg. log likelihood -0.019621 LR stat. (6 variables) 15.44999 
Prob. (LR stat.) 0.003853 McFadden R² 0.674929 
Observations : Dep=0 /1  141 / 2 Total 143 
 
 
 
Prediction evaluation (cut-off C = 0.5) 
 Estimated prob. 
 Dep=0 Dep=1 Total 
P(Dep=1)≤C 140 1 141 
P(Dep=1)>C 1 1 2 
Total 141 2 143 
Correct 140 1 141 
% Correct 99.30 50.00 98.59 
% Incorrect 0.70 50.00 1.41 
Prediction evaluation (cut-off C = 0.25) 
P(Dep=1)≤C 140 1 141 
P(Dep=1)>C 1 1 2 
Total 141 2 143 
Correct 140 1 141 
% Correct 99.30 50.00 98.59 
% Incorrect 0.70 50.00 1.41 
Prediction evaluation (cut-off C = 0.2) 
P(Dep=1)≤C 140 0 140 
P(Dep=1)>C 1 2 3 
Total 141 2 143 
Correct 140 2 142 
% Correct 99.30 100.00 99.60 
% Incorrect 0.70 0.00 0.70 
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V.4. Out-of-sample results and forecasts 
 
Since Berg and Pattillo’s (1998, 1999) justified criticisms formulated against the predictive 
power of the EWS models that are only estimated in-sample (estimating a model using data 
on a set of crises and then evaluating its performance according to the estimated results and to 
the prediction ability), it has become frequent to test the forecast performance of the EWSs 
out-of-sample given that “the key is the prediction of futures crises, not the ability to fit a set 
of observations after the fact” as stated in Berg and Pattillo (1999). A ‘good’ EWS model 
should thus provide both successful in-sample and out-of-sample predictions. However, as the 
determinants of the crises may vary significantly through time, a good EWS model in-sample 
may not be quite performing in predicting out-of-sample crises. This observation hence tones 
down in part Berg and Pattillo’s criticisms. 
 
I hereby evaluate the out-of-sample predictive performance of the logit model by estimating it 
in a sample period (2003:01-2008:12). The goal is to demonstrate whether the model predicts 
the May 2006 and October 2008 currency crises.14 In that sense, I firstly construct a crisis 
index of 1ISP  type which defines currency crises as episodes of high speculative pressures on 
currency. I secondly set a crisis threshold at three standard deviations 13 ISPσ  above the index 
mean 1ISPµ . This index perfectly detects both Turkish crises as shown on the below Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. The crisis index ISP1 for the period 2003-2008 
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14
 These data are also gathered from the IFS (January 2009) and the CBRT. 
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Table 16. The crisis indicators of the out-of-sample model (2003:01-2008:12) 
Dependent Variable: ISP1>3SD / Sample (adjusted): 2003M03 2008M12 – 70 Observations 
Variable Coeff. Std. error z-Stat. Prob. 
C 95.48652 114.2935 0.835450 0.4035 
BUDGET/GDP -58.63212 41.39370 -1.658033 0.0973 
M2/RES -0.360438 1.892620 -0.190444 0.8490 
RER-hpRER -69.74268 44.34187 -1.205470 0.1609 
SHORTDEBT/RES -4.200362 15.73407 -0.266960 0.7895 
TOT -57.08049 38.16238 -1.319352 0.1536 
IFF 1.072229 0.778991 1.348105 0.1309 
Mean dependent variable 0.028571 Std. deviation of dependent variable 0.167802 
Std. error of regression 0.123421 Akaike 0.209000 
Log likelihood -3.814993 Schwarz 0.333849 
Restr. log likelihood -9.081849 Hannan-Quinn 0.198313 
Avg. log likelihood -0.054500 LR stat. (6 variables) 10.53371 
Prob. (LR stat.) 0.103902 McFadden R² 0.579932 
Observations: Dep=0 /1  68 / 2 Total 70 
 
 
Prediction evaluation (cut-off C = 0.5) 
 Estimated prob. 
 Dep=0 Dep=1 Total 
P(Dep=1)≤C 68 1 69 
P(Dep=1)>C 0 1 1 
Total 68 2 70 
Correct 68 1 69 
% Correct 100.00 50.00 98.57 
% Incorrect 0.00 50.00 1.43 
Prediction evaluation (cut-off C = 0.25) 
P(Dep=1)≤C 68 1 69 
P(Dep=1)>C 0 1 1 
Total 68 2 70 
Correct 68 1 69 
% Correct 100.00 50.00 98.57 
% Incorrect 0.00 50.00 1.43 
Prediction evaluation (cut-off C = 0.2) 
P(Dep=1)≤C 68 1 69 
P(Dep=1)>C 0 1 1 
Total 68 2 70 
Correct 68 1 69 
% Correct 100.00 50.00 98.57 
% Incorrect 0.00 50.00 1.43 
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Table 17. The crisis indicators of the out-of-sample model (2003:01-2008:12) with FDI/PORTINVEST 
Dependent Variable: ISP1>3SD / Sample (adjusted): 2003M03 2008M12 – 70 Observations 
Variable Coeff. Std. error z-Stat. Prob. 
C -7.843685 3.381883 -2.319324 0.0204 
BUDGET/GDP -85.06436 59.06183 -1.440260 0.1498 
M2/RES -0.560843 1.818847 -0.308351 0.7578 
RER-hpRER -57.65646 34.80437 -1.152041 0.1728 
SHORTDEBT/RES -2.139991 15.49886 -0.138074 0.8902 
FDI/PORTINVEST 0.048669 0.013812 1.762690 0.0456 
TOT -50.00318 31.69397 -1.445460 0.1150 
IFF 1.436961 0.838823 1.713069 0.0867 
Mean dependent variable 0.028571 Std. deviation of dependent variable 0.167802 
Std. error of regression 0.121566 Akaike 0.176770 
Log likelihood -3.186967 Schwarz 0.273135 
Restr. log likelihood -9.081849 Hannan-Quinn 0.185047 
Avg. log likelihood -0.045528 LR stat. (7 variables) 11.78976 
Prob. (LR stat.) 0.002754 McFadden R² 0.649084 
Observations: Dep=0 /1  68 / 2 Total 70 
 
 
Prediction evaluation (cut-off C = 0.5) 
 Estimated prob. 
 Dep=0 Dep=1 Total 
P(Dep=1)≤C 68 1 69 
P(Dep=1)>C 0 1 1 
Total 68 2 70 
Correct 68 1 69 
% Correct 100.00 50.00 98.57 
% Incorrect 0.00 50.00 1.43 
Prediction evaluation (cut-off C = 0.25) 
P(Dep=1)≤C 67 0 67 
P(Dep=1)>C 1 2 3 
Total 68 2 70 
Correct 67 2 69 
% Correct 98.53 100.00 99.27 
% Incorrect 1.47 0.00 2.86 
Prediction evaluation (cut-off C = 0.2) 
P(Dep=1)≤C 67 0 67 
P(Dep=1)>C 1 2 3 
Total 68 2 70 
Correct 67 2 69 
% Correct 98.53 100.00 99.27 
% Incorrect 1.47 0.00 2.86 
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Figure 10. Evolution of the explanatory variables of the out-of-sample models 
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The out-of-sample logit model is estimated with six significant indicators of the one-month 
lagged final model (Table 9). The estimation results presented in Table 16 indicate that only 4 
indicators among 6 ( /BUDGET GDP , RER hpRER− , TOT  and IFF ) are correctly signed 
and statistically significant at 15% level, contrary to 2 /M RES  and /SHORTDEBT RES . 
However, the model only predicts the occurrence of the October 2008 currency crisis, not the 
Mai 2006 crisis. It is only after the inclusion of /FDI PORTINVEST  that the model reaches 
to predict the 2006 crisis at 25% threshold level (Table 17). Note that the inclusion of a proxy 
indicator represents financial contagion might increase the forecast performance of the model. 
 
After showing the ‘good’ out-of-sample forecast performance of the model estimated with 
one-month lagged indicators, I aim here to demonstrate how far in advance the model 
correctly predicts Turkish out-of-sample crisis episodes. In this sense, I estimate successive 
logit models with three ( 3t − )-, six ( 6t − )- and twelve-month ( 12t − ) lagged early warning 
indicators while the dependent crisis variable remains at t . Note that the model is estimated 
with only significant indicators of the three-, six- and twelve-month lagged final models 
(Tables 13, 14 and 15). Firstly, as indicated in Table 18, /BUDGET GDP , RER hpRER− , 
/FDI PORTINVEST  and TOT  remain economically and statistically significant contrary to 
2 /M RES , /SHORTDEBT RES  and IFF . Moreover, the model reaches to predict the 
outbreak of the 2008 Turkish crisis, but not the 2006 crisis. Secondly, as indicated in Table 
19, RER hpRER− , TOT  and NIRUS  are still significant contrary to /SHORTDEBT RES  
and IFF . Besides, the model predicts the occurrence of the 2008 crisis, but not the 2006 
crisis. Finally, as indicated in Table 20, only two indicators ( NIRUS  and IFF ) are significant 
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at twelve month lag. Furthermore, the probability of the 2008 crisis is again correctly 
signalled by the model contrary to the probability of the 2006 crisis which remains 
unpredictable at three-, six- and twelve-month lags. This may be explained by the poor 
performance of the model, by the self-fulfilling character of this crisis or the transformation of 
the Turkish economy that the model cannot take into account.  
 
Table 18. The out-of-sample model estimated with three-month lagged crisis indicators (2003:01-2008:12) 
Dependent Variable: ISP1>3SD / Sample (adjusted): 2003M05 2008M12 – 68 Observations 
Variable Coeff. Std. error z-Stat. Prob. 
C 57.22585 78.86899 0.725581 0.4681 
BUDGET/GDP_3 -28.34477 20.86522 -1.387702 0.1350 
M2/RES_3 0.430702 1.961427 0.219586 0.8262 
RER-hpRER_3 -77.79496 56.91523 -1.466857 0.1117 
SHORTDEBT/RES_3 5.766734 11.07589 0.520657 0.6026 
FDI/PORTINVEST_3 -0.087160 0.062647 -1.212408 0.1716 
TOT_3 -72.77358 58.14690 -1.301241 0.1517 
IFF_3 0.684474 0.630666 0.992506 0.3699 
Mean dependent variable 0.029412 Std. deviation of dependent variable 0.170214 
Std. error of regression 0.141830 Akaike 0.385739 
Log likelihood -5.115111 Schwarz 0.646857 
Restr. log likelihood -9.023017 Hannan-Quinn 0.489202 
Avg. log likelihood -0.045528 LR stat. (7 variables) 7.815812 
Prob. (LR stat.) 0.199115 McFadden R² 0.433104 
Observations: Dep=0 /1  66 / 2 Total 68 
 
Prediction evaluation (cut-off C = 0.5) 
 Estimated prob. 
 Dep=0 Dep=1 Total 
P(Dep=1)≤C 66 1 67 
P(Dep=1)>C 0 1 1 
Total 66 2 68 
Correct 66 1 67 
% Correct 100.00 50.00 98.53 
% Incorrect 0.00 50.00 1.47 
Prediction evaluation (cut-off C = 0.25) 
P(Dep=1)≤C 65 1 66 
P(Dep=1)>C 1 1 2 
Total 66 2 68 
Correct 65 1 66 
% Correct 98.48 50.00 97.06 
% Incorrect 1.52 50.00 2.94 
Prediction evaluation (cut-off C = 0.2) 
P(Dep=1)≤C 65 1 66 
P(Dep=1)>C 1 1 2 
Total 66 2 68 
Correct 65 1 66 
% Correct 98.48 50.00 97.06 
% Incorrect 1.52 50.00 2.94 
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Table 19. The out-of-sample model estimated with six-month lagged crisis indicators 
Dependent Variable: ISP1>3SD / Sample (adjusted): 2003M08 2008M12 – 65 Observations 
Variable Coeff. Std. error z-Stat. Prob. 
C 61.86529 48.80553 1.267588 0.2049 
RER-hpRER_6 -23.35229 18.40712 -1.108020 0.1932 
SHORTDEBT/RES_6 -4.677878 9.107810 -0.513612 0.6075 
TOT_6 -67.10417 51.98672 -1.490794 0.1068 
DNIRUS_6 18.59298 12.59004 1.674361 0.0825 
IFF_6 -0.694245 0.997066 -0.696287 0.4862 
Mean dependent variable 0.030769 Std. deviation of dependent variable 0.174036 
Std. error of regression 0.173417 Akaike 0.417947 
Log likelihood -6.583266 Schwarz 0.652111 
Restr. log likelihood -8.931390 Hannan-Quinn 0.510340 
Avg. log likelihood -0.101281 LR stat. (5 variables) 4.696249 
Prob. (LR stat.) 0.283319 McFadden R² 0.262907 
Observations: Dep=0 /1  63 / 2 Total 65 
 
 
Prediction evaluation (cut-off C = 0.5) 
 Estimated prob. 
 Dep=0 Dep=1 Total 
P(Dep=1)≤C 63 2 65 
P(Dep=1)>C 0 0 0 
Total 63 2 65 
Correct 63 0 63 
% Correct 100.00 0.00 96.92 
% Incorrect 0.00 100.00 3.08 
Prediction evaluation (cut-off C = 0.25) 
P(Dep=1)≤C 61 1 62 
P(Dep=1)>C 2 1 3 
Total 63 2 65 
Correct 61 1 62 
% Correct 96.83 50.00 95.38 
% Incorrect 3.17 50.00 4.62 
Prediction evaluation (cut-off C = 0.2) 
P(Dep=1)≤C 61 1 62 
P(Dep=1)>C 2 1 3 
Total 63 2 65 
Correct 61 1 62 
% Correct 96.83 50.00 95.38 
% Incorrect 3.17 50.00 4.62 
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Table 20. The out-of-sample model estimated with twelve-month lagged crisis indicators 
Dependent Variable: ISP1>3SD / Sample (adjusted): 2004M02 2008M12 – 59 Observations 
Variable Coeff. Std. error z-Stat. Prob. 
C 61.86529 48.80553 1.267588 0.2049 
DISE_12 -29.49632 60.89665 -0.484367 0.6281 
RER-hpRER_12 0.000340 0.000481 0.707176 0.4795 
CA/GDP_12 10.41111 35.59472 0.292490 0.7699 
TOT_12 -34.18943 335.0912 -0.102030 0.9187 
DNIRUS_12 25.43002 19.71288 1.499135 0.1398 
IFF_12 12.18277 7.915082 1.539185 0.1238 
Mean dependent variable 0.033898 Std. deviation of dependent variable 0.182521 
Std. error of regression 0.147511 Akaike 0.428779 
Log likelihood -5.648995 Schwarz 0.675267 
Restr. log likelihood -8.734493 Hannan-Quinn 0.524998 
Avg. log likelihood -0.095746 LR stat. (6 variables) 6.170996 
Prob. (LR stat.) 0.404310 McFadden R² 0.353254 
Observations: Dep=0 /1  57 / 2 Total 59 
 
Prediction evaluation (cut-off C = 0.5) 
 Estimated prob. 
 Dep=0 Dep=1 Total 
P(Dep=1)≤C 57 1 58 
P(Dep=1)>C 0 1 1 
Total 57 2 59 
Correct 57 1 58 
% Correct 100.00 50.00 98.31 
% Incorrect 0.00 50.00 1.69 
Prediction evaluation (cut-off C = 0.25) 
P(Dep=1)≤C 56 1 57 
P(Dep=1)>C 1 1 2 
Total 57 2 59 
Correct 56 1 57 
% Correct 99.10 50.00 97.31 
% Incorrect 0.90 50.00 2.69 
Prediction evaluation (cut-off C = 0.2) 
P(Dep=1)≤C 56 1 57 
P(Dep=1)>C 1 1 2 
Total 57 2 59 
Correct 56 1 57 
% Correct 99.10 50.00 97.31 
% Incorrect 0.90 50.00 2.69 
 
VI. Concluding remarks 
 
This large theoretical and empirical study aimed at presenting the recent “history of crises” of 
the Turkish economy. After summarizing the stylized facts of the Turkish economy in the last 
three decades and then the developments of the theoretical and empirical currency crisis 
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literature, I constructed an EWS model which identified very well the determinants of the four 
severe or less severe Turkish crisis episodes. Besides, the model performed quite well in 
predicting in-sample and out-of-sample these all four Turkish crises. This very good forecast 
performance of the model may push more the modelers to adopt one-country EWS approach. 
 
Despite a relatively long 15 years period, i.e. the time between the first crisis occurred in 
April 1994 and the last one came out in October 2008, I can affirm according to the 
estimation results of the several logit models that the nearly same factors caused crises in the 
Turkish economy: excessive budget deficits ( /BUDGET GDP ), high money supply growths 
( 2 /M RES ), real exchange rate overvaluations ( RER hpRER− ) sharp rises in short-term 
external debt ( /SHORTDEBT RES ), growing riskiness of the banking system ( IFF , in 
particular currency and liquidity mismatches) and external adverse shocks (TOT  and 
NIRUS ). What may one draw then as a conclusion from these recurrent crisis events? Do not 
Turkish authorities take necessary pre-emptive economic and political measures? Are the so-
called IMF supported structural reforms implemented since the 2001 crisis not enough to 
prevent repetitive crises in the Turkish economy? Are financial markets too sensitive to 
changes in the Turkish economy? 
 
Whatever the conclusion or reason, Turkey needs first to reform its either economic and 
financial structure or political system, second to provide political and economic credibility for 
domestic and foreign investors with or without support of an external organization such as the 
IMF or the European Union (EU). In that sense, the Turkish membership perspective to EU 
gains a great importance. However, there is still considerable uncertainty in certain circles in 
Europe concerning Turkish membership even in a long-term (10 to 15 years). Note also that 
the recurrent crisis episodes and the last global financial crisis which has been affecting the 
whole planet also underline increasing instabilities in international financial markets in the 
globalization context in which the States’ financial regulation and supervision ability has been 
excessively reduced. One can thus state that the world needs to restructure or redefine the 
international financial architecture or at least take a range of initiatives to strengthen it. 
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Appendix I. Descriptive statistics and correlation tests of the explanatory variables (January 1990-December 2002) 
 
Table 21. Descriptive statistics 
Indicator DIPROD DISE DINFL 
BUDGET 
/GDP M2/RES 
RER-
hpRER CA/GDP 
SHORTDEBT 
/RES 
FDI/ 
PORTI. TOT DNIRUS 
BLOAN 
/BDEPO 
BRES/ 
BASSET 
BDEPO 
/M2 
BSHORT 
POS 
CBCRED 
/BLIAB IFF 
Mean 
 0.20576  76.6086  1.6203 -0.0223  2.36938  0.00362 -0.0012  1.41334 -5.9533  1.0772 -0.0440  1.716368  0.12528  1.89971  1.15717  0.029592  0.69503 
Median 
 0.18220  6.25667  0.5488 -0.0261  1.69858 -0.0054 -0.0014  1.10625 -0.7878  1.0763 -0.0200  1.630095  0.12486  2.01848  1.13527  0.027875  0.59799 
Max. 
 11.9207  4933.14  13.153  0.03508  5.67195  0.29401  0.00601  4.72112  48.3146  1.2602  0.63000  2.613611  0.20980  2.64664  2.25833  0.167605  8.26937 
Min. 
-13.470 -3199.7 -0.003 -0.0965  1.06557 -0.1282 -0.0079  0.59990 -277.35  0.9334 -0.8300  0.923075  0.06942  1.16553  0.64628  0.002447 -5.9635 
St. Dev. 
 4.79573  906.685  2.3605  0.02796  1.14839  0.06276  0.00309  0.71441  29.2142  0.0760  0.21655  0.403156  0.03106  0.36003  0.32931  0.024050  1.70147 
Skewness 
-0.1616  1.81407  2.2643 -0.0567  0.98339  1.44680  0.28006  1.93928 -6.5317  0.1082 -0.4245  0.115002  0.35987 -0.5664  0.51453  2.142725  0.82383 
Kurtosis 
 3.41021  13.6467  8.6623  2.29713  2.72700  6.29533  2.45028  7.75622  54.7992  2.1817  4.97200  2.159691  2.54954  2.23659  2.83647  11.72447  7.81785 
Jarque-
Bera  1.76219  817.081  339.51  3.27370  25.4638  124.207  3.97794  243.252  18430.9  4.6263  29.7719  4.902014  4.65605  12.0522  7.01202  610.1930  167.441 
Sum 
 31.8942  11874.3  251.15 -3.4704  367.254  0.56160 -0.18952  219.068 -922.76  166.96 -6.8200  266.0370  19.4187  294.455  179.361  4.586768  107.730 
Obs.  155  155  155  155  155  155  155  155  155  155  155  155  155  155  155  155  155 
 
Table 22. Correlation matrix 
Indicator DIPROD DISE DINFL 
BUDGET 
/GDP M2/RES 
RER-
hpRER CA/GDP 
SHORTDEBT 
/RES 
FDI/ 
PORTI. TOT DNIRUS 
BLOAN 
/BDEPO 
BRES/ 
BASSET 
BDEPO 
/M2 
BSHORT 
POS 
CBCRED 
/BLIAB 
DIPROD  1.00000  0.0736  0.01345  0.06819  0.00023 -0.0628 -0.0703 -0.057052  0.09899 -0.0402 -0.0495 -0.0802  0.00961 -0.0022  0.05591 -0.10636 
DISE  0.07366  1.0000  0.21179  0.01337 -0.0586 -0.0145 -0.0930 -0.067738  0.07126 -0.0125 -0.0759  0.0543 -0.0367  0.0222 -0.0624 -0.01440 
DINFL  0.01345  0.2117  1.00000 -0.5178 -0.4358  0.30634  0.26296 -0.396607 -0.0903 -0.5911 -0.2608  0.3433 -0.6230  0.5958 -0.4617  0.470703 
BUDGET/GDP  0.06819  0.0133 -0.5178  1.00000  0.57866 -0.2030 -0.2917  0.282522  0.16999  0.60872 -0.0110 -0.3957  0.51743 -0.6665  0.24151 -0.29728 
M2/RES  0.00023 -0.058 -0.4358  0.57866  1.00000 -0.0297 -0.1439  0.683882 -0.1146  0.48830 -0.1404 -0.4204  0.65145 -0.7500  0.33771  0.056499 
RER-hpRER -0.0628 -0.014  0.30634 -0.2030 -0.0297  1.00000  0.51112  0.194401 -0.1533 -0.2369 -0.0023  0.0970  0.00610  0.2123  0.10267  0.088186 
CA/GDP -0.0703 -0.093  0.26296 -0.2917 -0.1439  0.51112  1.00000  0.043372 -0.0533 -0.2155 -0.0878  0.0328 -0.0481  0.2648  0.19325  0.039641 
SHORTDEBT/RES -0.0570 -0.067 -0.3966  0.28252  0.68388  0.19440  0.04337  1.000000 -0.0230  0.51382  0.12341 -0.1534  0.40460 -0.4486  0.25767  0.030128 
FDI/PORTINVEST  0.09899  0.0712 -0.0903  0.16999 -0.1146 -0.1533 -0.0533 -0.023021  1.00000  0.08419  0.19508 -0.0389 -0.0225  0.1171  0.03545 -0.36473 
TOT -0.0402 -0.012 -0.5911  0.60872  0.48830 -0.2369 -0.2155  0.513821  0.08419  1.00000  0.10420 -0.0951  0.37603 -0.5108  0.05810 -0.14332 
DNIRUS -0.0495 -0.075 -0.2608 -0.0110 -0.1404 -0.0023 -0.0878  0.123413  0.19508  0.10420  1.00000 -0.0950  0.11853  0.1034  0.12312 -0.28266 
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BLOAN/BDEPO -0.0802  0.0543  0.34331 -0.3957 -0.4204  0.09704  0.03284 -0.153446 -0.0389 -0.0951 -0.0950  1.0000 -0.6817  0.5416 -0.6301  0.527383 
BRES/BASSET  0.00961 -0.036 -0.6230  0.51743  0.65145  0.00610 -0.0481  0.404607 -0.0225  0.37603  0.11853 -0.6817  1.00000 -0.7749  0.75909 -0.35527 
BDEPO/M2 -0.0022  0.0222  0.59583 -0.6665 -0.7500  0.21235  0.26482 -0.448686  0.11717 -0.5108  0.10341  0.5416 -0.7749  1.0000 -0.4679  0.060189 
BSHORTPOS  0.05591 -0.062 -0.4617  0.24151  0.33771  0.10267  0.19325  0.257673  0.03545  0.05810  0.12312 -0.6301  0.75909 -0.4679  1.00000 -0.46722 
CBCRED/BLIAB -0.10636 -0.014  0.47070 -0.2972  0.05649  0.08818  0.03964  0.030128 -0.3647 -0.1433 -0.28266  0.5273 -0.35527  0.0601 -0.46722  1.000000 
 
Table 23. Correlation matrix with IFF 
Indicator DIPROD DISE DINFL BUDGET/GDP M2/RES 
RER-
hpRER CA/GDP SHORTDEBT/RES FDI/PORTI. TOT DNIRUS IFF 
DIPROD  1.000000  0.073665  0.013456  0.068194  0.00023 -0.062845 -0.070381 -0.057052  0.098993 -0.040256 -0.049574  0.07258 
DISE  0.073665  1.000000  0.211790  0.013370 -0.05866 -0.014562 -0.093000 -0.067738  0.071266 -0.012593 -0.075983 -0.13418 
DINFL  0.013456  0.211790  1.000000 -0.517853 -0.43582  0.306342  0.262969 -0.396607 -0.090306 -0.591115 -0.260879 -0.26660 
BUDGET/GDP  0.068194  0.013370 -0.517853  1.000000  0.57866 -0.203071 -0.291772  0.282522  0.169997  0.608729 -0.011019 -0.02581 
M2/RES  0.000231 -0.058665 -0.435829  0.578667  1.00000 -0.029737 -0.143946  0.683882 -0.114627  0.488308 -0.140430  0.05363 
RER/HPRER -0.062845 -0.014562  0.306342 -0.203071 -0.02973  1.000000  0.511129  0.194401 -0.153339 -0.236957 -0.002345 -0.08278 
CA/GDP -0.070381 -0.093000  0.262969 -0.291772 -0.14394  0.511129  1.000000  0.043372 -0.053311 -0.215559 -0.087882 -0.21456 
SHORTDEBT/RES -0.057052 -0.067738 -0.396607  0.282522  0.68388  0.194401  0.043372  1.000000 -0.023021  0.513821  0.123413  0.18140 
FDI/PORTINVEST  0.098993  0.071266 -0.090306  0.169997 -0.11462 -0.153339 -0.053311 -0.023021  1.000000  0.084190  0.195082 -0.03055 
TOT -0.040256 -0.012593 -0.591115  0.608729  0.48830 -0.236957 -0.215559  0.513821  0.084190  1.000000  0.104206  0.05861 
DNIRUS -0.049574 -0.075983 -0.260879 -0.011019 -0.14043 -0.002345 -0.087882  0.123413  0.195082  0.104206  1.000000 -0.00701 
IFF  0.072580 -0.134188 -0.266604 -0.025811  0.05363 -0.082783 -0.214566  0.181405 -0.030555  0.058615 -0.007011  1.00000 
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Appendix II. Descriptive statistics and correlation tests of the explanatory variables (January 2003-December 2008) 
 
Table 24. Descriptive statistics 
Indicator DIPROD DISE DINFL BUDGET/GDP M2/RES 
RER-
hpRER CA/GDP SHORTDEBT/RES FDI/PORTI. TOT DNIRUS IFF 
Mean 
-0.001859  210.6325  2.991789 -0.012393  2.826996 -0.008900 -0.004236  0.720288  1.206710  0.948975  0.006761  1.049386 
Median 
 0.785000  529.9323  2.839000 -0.027335  3.082499 -0.008457 -0.004814  0.710432 -1.950786  0.948582  0.030000  0.877376 
Max. 
 17.74400  5976.645  11.87300  0.069156  4.327765  0.069859  0.002973  0.962977  234.0564  1.007840  0.800000  5.376024 
Min. 
-19.55400 -8393.082 -2.990000 -0.106026  1.389426 -0.074683 -0.009389  0.545467 -147.0232  0.866511 -1.960000 -2.764689 
St. Deviation 
 6.626495  2590.973  2.802100  0.048402  0.892763  0.035234  0.002483  0.108236  36.75010  0.030485  0.348100  1.470265 
Skewness 
-0.352747 -0.706926  0.339172  0.215208 -0.000494  0.137993  0.712663  0.298114  2.679192 -0.415434 -3.092053  0.450164 
Kurtosis 
 4.402079  4.316412  3.260710  2.133916  1.578985  2.780914  3.356327  2.177836  27.57263  2.995680  17.94256  4.030551 
Jarque-Bera 
 7.287988  11.04026  1.562355  2.767105  5.973721  0.367327  6.385629  3.051349  1871.223  2.042316  773.6727  5.539853 
Sum 
-0.132000  14954.90  212.4170 -0.879881  200.7167 -0.631878 -0.300749  51.14044  85.67643  67.37724  0.480000  74.50643 
Observations  71  71  71  71  71  71  71  71  71  71  71  71 
 
Table 25. Correlation matrix 
Indicator DIPROD DISE DINFL BUDGET/GDP M2/RES 
RER-
hpRER CA/GDP SHORTDEBT/RES FDI/PORTI. TOT DNIRUS IFF 
DIPROD  1.000000 -0.127825  0.062666  0.107642 -0.067369 -0.137815 -0.111994  0.003025 -0.003021  0.113124 -0.008392  0.071904 
DISE -0.127825  1.000000 -0.229499 -0.109868 -0.196528 -0.268987  0.101996  0.044771  0.129318  0.305499  0.130491 -0.42963 
DINFL  0.062666 -0.229499  1.000000  0.074682 -0.016929  0.166442 -0.033094 -0.038307  0.104438 -0.258504 -0.004645  0.181206 
BUDGET/GDP  0.107642 -0.109868  0.074682  1.000000  0.009270 -0.003096  0.051960 -0.012716 -0.125058 -0.074608 -0.153614 -0.11007 
M2/RES -0.067369 -0.196528 -0.016929  0.009270  1.000000  0.305257 -0.368134 -0.372079  0.056881 -0.726612 -0.235606 -0.00269 
RER-hpRER -0.137815 -0.268987  0.166442 -0.003096  0.305257  1.000000 -0.068486  0.128662 -0.223383 -0.581183 -0.014536  0.290281 
CA/GDP -0.111994  0.101996 -0.033094  0.051960 -0.368134 -0.068486  1.000000  0.196567 -0.063707  0.139481 -0.004203 -0.10431 
SHORTDEBT/RES  0.003025  0.044771 -0.038307 -0.012716 -0.372079  0.128662  0.196567  1.000000 -0.018407  0.202048  0.305593  0.179975 
FDI/PORTINVEST -0.003021  0.129318  0.104438 -0.125058  0.056881 -0.223383 -0.063707 -0.018407  1.000000 -0.052661  0.015822 -0.14327 
TOT  0.113124  0.305499 -0.258504 -0.074608 -0.726612 -0.581183  0.139481  0.202048 -0.052661  1.000000  0.244214 -0.05943 
DNIRUS -0.008392  0.130491 -0.004645 -0.153614 -0.235606 -0.014536 -0.004203  0.305593  0.015822  0.244214  1.000000  0.239513 
IFF  0.071904 -0.429631  0.181206 -0.110074 -0.002698  0.290281 -0.104310  0.179975 -0.143272 -0.059430  0.239513  1.000000 
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Appendix III. Forecast performance of the consecutive logit models 
 
Figure 11. Forecast performance of the logit model estimated only with public and real sector variables 
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02
Residual Actual Fitted
 
Figure 12. Forecast performance of the logit model estimated only with external balance and capital flows 
variables 
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Figure 13. Forecast performance of the logit model estimated only with financial sector variables 
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Figure 14. Forecast performance of the final logit model 
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Figure 15. Forecast performance of the final logit model with three-month lagged indicators 
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Figure 16. Forecast performance of the final logit model with six-month lagged indicators 
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Figure 17. Forecast performance of the final logit model with twelve-month lagged indicators 
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Figure 18. Forecast performance of the out-of-sample logit model 
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Figure 19. Forecast performance of the out-of-sample logit model with FDI/PORTINVEST 
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Figure 20. Forecast performance of the out-of-sample logit model with three-month lagged indicators 
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Figure 21. Forecast performance of the out-of-sample logit model with six-month lagged indicators 
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Figure 22. Forecast performance of the out-of-sample logit model with twelve-month lagged indicators 
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